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ABSTRACT
A proliferation of network-enabled devices and network-intensive applications re-
quire the underlying networks not only to be agile despite of complex and heterogeneous
environments, but also to be highly available and scalable in order to guarantee service
integrity and continuity. The Software-Defined Network (SDN) has recently emerged to
address the problem of the ossified Internet protocol architecture and to enable agile and
flexible network evolvement. SDN, however, heavily relies on control messages between
a controller and the forwarding devices for the network operation. Thus, it becomes even
more critical to guarantee network high availability (HA) and scalability between a con-
troller and its forwarding devices in the SDN architecture.
In this dissertation, we address HA and scalability issues that are inherent in the
current OpenFlow specification and SDN architecture; and solve the problems using prac-
tical techniques. With extensive experiments using real systems, we have identified that
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the significant issues of HA and scalability in operations of a SDN such as single point
of failure of multiple logical connections, multiple redundant configuration, unrecover-
able interconnection failure, interface flapping, new flow attack, and event storm. We
have designed and implemented the management frameworks that deal with SDN HA and
scalability issues that we have observed from a real system. The proposed frameworks
include various SDN HA and scalability strategies. For SDN HA, we have developed sev-
eral SDN control path HA algorithms such as ensuring logical control path redundancy,
transparency of a controller cluster, and fast and accurate failure detection. We validate
the functionalities of the proposed SDN HA schemes with real network experiments. The
proposed SDN control path HA algorithms overcome the limitations of the current Open-
Flow specification and enhance performance as well as simplify management of SDN
control path HA. For SDN scalability, we have proposed and developed our management
framework in two different platforms; an embedded approach in the OpenFlow switch
and an agent-based approach with the SUMA platform that is located near the Open-
Flow switch. These platforms include various algorithms that enhance scalability of SDN
such as Detect and Mitigate Abnormality (DMA), Modify and Annotate Control (MAC),
and Message Prioritization and Classification (MPC). We have shown that the proposed
framework effectively detects and filters malicious and abnormal network behaviors such
as new flow attack, interface flapping, and event storm.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Modern computer networking is more complicated now than it ever has been.
A proliferation of network-enabled devices and bandwidth-intensive applications lead to
the massive growth of customer’s demands for higher bandwidth and better quality of
networks. As the networks progress, it is getting more difficult to efficiently manage
them. Network volume and complexity come to the fore as the main reasons that hinder
efficient network management. As the number of network devices in the network gets
higher, operating expense (OPEX) of the network accordingly increases. In addition, as
more network layers, various protocols, and multiple vendors are introduced in a given
network, network operation and management becomes even more inefficient and difficult.
In order to grapple with closed, inflexible, complex, error-prone, and hard-to-
manage production network problems, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [4, 57, 78]
has been proposed by many network companies and researchers. Particularly, fueled
by increasing data center networking and cloud computing, SDN has been building up
significant momentum towards production network deployment. This recently emerging
concept of a network architecture supports the programmable control interfaces by sep-
arating and abstracting the control plane from the data plane. This centralized control
plane, called an SDN controller, becomes the brain of the underlying network. SDN en-
ables many features, such as traffic engineering and network virtualization, in the form of
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an application on top of the controller of the network. In addition, SDN allows for rapid
and simplified network exploration that improves network reliability, manageability, and
security. Therefore, the centralized controller plays a very important role in controlling
and operating for example, imposing policies and making decisions for routing, underly-
ing network switches. Logically, it lies between northbound applications and southbound
network devices. The OpenFlow protocol [63], which is managed by Open Networking
Foundation (ONF) [61] is the de facto protocol that is being used for communication
between the controller and the underlying network devices (e.g., OpenFlow switches).
Northbound APIs are used for communication between the controller and the applica-
tions. These applications are developed to fulfill a specific purpose. The controller is an
agent that connects applications and network devices and manages flow control to enable
intelligent networking based on the applications’ needs. As mentioned, this centralized
architecture takes all the intelligence from the underlying network switches and leaves a
flow table in the network switches. When the network switches receive new packets, they
will forward these packets to the controller to decide where to send them.
High Availability (HA) of a network control system is important in real network
operation. Thus, provisioning redundancies a priori, then detecting failures and invoking
mitigation mechanisms are the necessary steps in action. In the traditional network, HA is
solely limited to data paths so that the system maintains a certain level of availability such
as Service-Level Agreement (SLA). In the SDN architecture, the issue of HA becomes
more critical, especially for the controllers of SDNs, as they are responsible for the func-
tions of the network switches. Furthermore, the SDN architecture poses more complexity
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on HA issues by creating a couple of separate HA network domains such as a controller
cluster network as well as control and data plane connection networks in addition to the
data plane network. Although there have been a few recent studies that focus on the fail-
ures of switches or links connecting them in data plane, little work is found to consider the
failures of the controller cluster network itself or to orchestrate the failure detection and
recoveries of all the separate HA network domains. Another important aspect with regard
to HA is fast and accurate failure detection. Detecting a failure quickly and accurately is
also very critical to maintain HA of a system. This is because slow or incorrect failure
detection delays the root cause analysis of the problem and delays recovery of the system.
As a result, overall performance of the system’s HA would be degraded. Therefore, we
additionally focus on how fast we can detect failures in order to reduce the downtime of
the network and improve HA of the network in the SDN environment.
Along with HA, scalability of a network system is also important in a real network
operation. There has been some research conducted on the scalability issue of an SDN
controller. That research can be divided into three types such as improving the capacity
of the controller itself by using parallel processing and multi-threads, devolving some
control functions to the OpenFlow switches, and clustering multiple controllers. Most of
the existing approaches try to increase the system capacity to accommodate the increasing
amount of network traffic between a controller and underlying switches. However, if we
look at the network messages between a controller and underlying switches more closely,
we can find each message has different importance according to the activities and status
of the current network.
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In this research, we study various aspects of controller’s HA impacting the overall
performance of SDN. We identify several critical HA issues and propose a solution for
each problem. In addition, we also study and propose solutions for SDN scalability using
prioritization and classification techniques.
1.1 Software-Defined Networks
SDN is an emerging computer networking paradigm that supports programmable
interfaces which provide an agile and convenient way to customize the network traffic
control. The main contribution of the SDN architecture is the disaggregation of the ver-
tically integrated networking planes in order to improve network flexibility and manage-
ability. The control plane of the vertical network stack is decoupled and abstracted to
interact and handle all of the underlying network devices within its domain. It is logically
centralized and is called an SDN controller. An SDN controller can run on a commodity
server. With this centralized controller in the network, it gets a global view on the un-
derlying network with ease. In addition, new services can be loaded up to the controller
and each differentiated service can utilize the global view of the controller to achieve
its optimized performance. Therefore, SDN brings many benefits such as easier traffic
optimization, agile new feature deployment, and reduced management cost.
As illustrated in Figure 1, this centralized architecture takes all the intelligence
from the underlying network switches and leaves a flow table in the network switches.
Therefore, when the network switches receive packets, they will search the matching
rules from the flow tables. Each flow table consists of flow entries and there are six
4
Figure 1: Software-Defined Networks (SDN) architecture
main components in each flow entry such as match fields, priority, counters, instructions,
timeouts, and cookie. The match fields category, which consists of the ingress port and
packet headers, is the most important factor to examine incoming packets. If there is a
matching flow entry, the switch will handle the packets according to the associated action
of its instructions category. If there is no matching flow entry (e.g., new packets), then
they will forward these new packets to the controller in order to ask how to handle them.
Many companies, universities, and research institutes have been involved in de-
veloping and improving SDN for practical use. Major components of SDN are SDN
controllers, OpenFlow protocol, and OpenFlow switches. Table 1 and 2 compares the
5
SDN Cont roller 
Table 1: Open source SDN controllers
Controller Languages OpenFlow Protocol Copyright
Beacon [11] Java 1.0 Apache 2.0 license
Floodlight [13] Java 1.0 Apache 2.0 license
IRIS [14] Java 1.0  1.3 Apache 2.0 license
Maestro [3] Java 1.0 GNU LGPL v2.1
Mul [15] C 1.0  1.4 GNU GPL v2.0
Nox [16] C++ & Python 1.0 Apache 2.0 license
OpenDaylight [17] Java 1.0  1.4 Eclipse public license v1.0
Pox [18] Pyhon 1.0 Apache 2.0 license
Ryu [19] Python 1.0  1.4 Apache 2.0 license
Trema [20] Ruby & C 1.0 GNU GPL v2.0
specifications of the current SDN controllers. Various SDN controllers have been de-
veloped and are currently running commercially and academically such as Beacon [11],
Floodlight [13], IRIS [14], Maestro [3], Mul [15], Nox [29], OpenDaylight [17], Pox [18],
Ryu [19], Trema [20] and etc.
Being a detailed embodiment of SDN, OpenFlow [63] is a configuration language
and protocol that abstracts the data plane of a networking device into a flow based archi-
tecture composed of a cascading set of classifiers and policy enforcement. The OpenFlow
protocol is currently the de facto standard being used for the communication between
an SDN controller and an OpenFlow switch. It is an open source project managed by
Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [61]. It enables an SDN controller to control the
forwarding plane of switches/routers. It also helps an SDN controller collect statistical
information from the network in order to have a global view on the underlying network.
The OpenFlow protocol is currently being implemented by major switch/router vendors
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Table 2: Commercial SDN controllers
Controller Languages OpenFlow Protocol Company
Big Network Controller Java 1.0  1.3 Big Switch Networks
ONE Java 1.0  1.4 Cisco
Contrail Java & Python 1.0  1.3 Juniper Networks
ProgammableFlow Ruby & C 1.0  1.3 NEC
SDN VE Java & Python 1.0  1.3 IBM
ViSION Java 1.0  1.3 HP
Vyatta Java 1.0  1.4 Brocade
to support and deliver OpenFlow-enabled products. Various OpenFlow switches are com-
mercially available in the market.
1.2 Network Availability
Achieving network availability is one of the most important operational objectives
of network service providers (NSPs). Availability is the fraction of a time that a system
or component is continuously operational. Figure 2 describes terminologies related to
network availability. HA can be measured by three main metrics such as Mean Time
Between Failures (MTBF), Mean Time To Repair (MTTRr), and Mean Time To Failure
(MTTF). MTBF is an expected average time between failures of a network component.
MTTRr is an expected average time to restore a failed network component. The average
downtime can be further divided into two parts such as MTTD and MTTRc. MTTD is an
expected average time to detect a failed network component and MTTRc is an expected
average time to recover the failed network component. Lastly, MTTF is a mean time to
failure once the network component starts working normally. Therefore, the availability
7
Table 3: Network downtime according to the number of nines
Availability Downtime per year Downtime per month Downtime per week
90% 36.5 days 72 hours 16.8 hours
99% 3.65 days 7.2 hours 1.68 hours
99.9% 8.76 hours 43.8 minutes 10.1 minutes
99.99% 52.56 minutes 4.32 minutes 1.01 minutes
99.999% 5.26 minutes 25.9 seconds 6.05 seconds
of the network component can be calculated by the formula as shown in Equation 1.1.
Table 3 shows the operational performance (i.e., downtime) according to the number of
nines. As we have more nines, we can say that the network is more stable.
Availability =
MTTF
MTBF
=
MTBF  MTTD  MTTRc
MTBF
(1.1)
Many technologies have been developed to increase network availability and en-
sure the network reliability requirements. A traditional HA architecture supports link
bundling, multipath routing, system redundancy mechanisms along with efficient state
synchronization, and failure detection and handling protocols. These HA mechanisms
are implemented in each network device as a distributed protocol to handle the network
problems according to the dedicated network topologies.
The emerging concept of SDN decouples the control plane from the underlying
network devices and abstracts it out as a centralized service. Many NSPs are very sup-
portive of its deployment due to potential benefits such as operational cost reduction and
enhanced system resilience. However, unlike traditional networks, the existing HA mech-
anisms may face many critical challenges to achieve the same Service Level Agreement
(SLA) of HA for the network services in the SDN environment where the out-of-band
8
Figure 2: Network availability timeline
connections and controller connections exist between the control and data planes and
between controllers, respectively. As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, unlike traditional net-
works, the SDN architecture poses more complex network reliability domains by creating
new connection network domains between the control and data planes as well as among
the control plane. We named the connection network domains as the control path. The is-
sue of HA becomes more crucial on the ‘SDN controllers’ than the ‘OpenFlow switches’,
as well as it is significantly related to the scalability of the SDN controllers, as they are
responsible for the intelligent decision of the OpenFlow switch policies.
1.3 Network Scalability
In the traditional network systems, the main network functionalities such as data,
control, and management planes are distributed and embedded within the vendor spe-
cific networking devices and are managed remotely by EMSs [26], NMSs [60], OSSs,
9
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Figure 3: Multilateral SDN reliability domains
and BSSs [65] through provisioning and configuration. As the network systems become
bigger, faster, and more complex over multiple administration domains and diverse com-
ponents, they need to handle multiple protocols with cross-layer interactions, support
various applications and services over multi-tenant policies, and are managed over un-
certain underlying topology and internal structure. At the same time, the network ser-
vices and applications are expected to be deployed quickly and more dynamically on the
large-scale networking systems while insuring security, reliability, performance, traffic
isolation, end-to-end virtualization and priority treatment. However, providing quick and
easy dynamic network adaptability is an intrinsically difficult problem for legacy network
systems, as they can barely cope with the complexity through the layers of the extensive
and expensive remote provisioning and configuration.
More specifically, traffic and resource monitoring is the essential function for
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Figure 4: Definition of control path
large-scale enterprises, service providers, and network operators to ensure network re-
liability, network availability, and security of their resources. For this reason, many
large-scale enterprises and providers have been investing in various stand-alone dedicated
monitoring solutions. However, they find that a proprietary and dedicated stand-alone
hardware-based appliance per feature is inflexible, slow to install, and difficult to main-
tain as well as being cost prohibitive. Because of such a huge required investment, many
enterprises are looking for outsourcing alternatives and providers are also looking for
means to reduce this cost.
As networks are evolving towards software defined networks, control and man-
agement functions are logically centralized and real-time, scalable, and dynamic mon-
itoring of managed resources is a key to make precise control decisions. In addition
11
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to this, virtualization (e.g., Network Virtualization (NV) and Network Function Virtual-
ization (NFV) [59]) of the underlying computing, network resources including Layer 4
(transport)  Layer 7 (application) capabilities, and network services has emerged as a
complementary approach along with SDN. Specially, NFV provides more flexible and
programmable monitoring functions which are used to be built in specific hardware. To
provide such flexible and programmable monitoring functions, virtualization of the mon-
itoring function itself can be a solution. That is, a monitoring function of a particular
objective can be instantiated on demand in real-time whenever a new monitoring require-
ment occurs and can dynamically be deleted once its demand completes. Since the main
benefit of NFV is the chaining of its functionality, the virtual monitoring function can be
utilized as a part of such a virtual function chaining. Even though SDN and NFV promise
flexibility, simplicity, and cost-effectiveness, the abstractions towards the remote and cen-
tralized control and management tend to introduce the following challenging problems:
 Scalability problem: The proposed SDN architecture tends to open up control mes-
sages between the controllers and the forwarding devices to the communication
networks, which is spatiotemporally concentrated around the centralized controller.
Several SDN scalability research studies such as DevoFlow [22], DIFANE [80],
ONIX [50] show that SDN imposes excessive control traffic overheads in order
for the controller to acquire global network visibility. More significantly, the over-
head will be further increased by traditional network management events as well
as the application specific control traffic, as they may use the same physical net-
work paths, buffers, and I/O channels at the same time. If the overheads are not
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controlled properly, they can cause various scalability problems on the network-
ing devices, controllers, and the network itself including slow message processing,
potential message drop, delayed root cause analysis, and late responses to urgent
problems.
 Inaccurate and unreliable management problem: In traditional network systems,
the network management practice mainly takes remote approaches coping with
the network-centric infrastructure. However, since the network events occurring
within the network should be inferred by the remote management systems, the po-
tential network problems are often accumulated and enlarged, and their diagnosis
is delayed, inaccurate, unreliable, and not scalable. SDN’s remote and centralized
control tends to extend the legacy network management problems into the control
plane.
 Multiple management pillar problem: Although SDN’s management plane is a rela-
tively unexplored area, either the SDN controller agnostic application of the incum-
bent management protocols or the full integration of the management plane into the
controller protocols such as OpenFlow cannot be the viable approach for the highly
dynamic SDN management. Moreover, there are growing expectations for the fine
grained management of the customer specific services and applications. Many ex-
isting SDN approaches evidence that SDN allows a variety of heterogeneous ap-
plication interfaces and protocols in the data plane. For example, according to the
most recent OpenDaylight controller architecture, SDN control and management
provides an expandable facility for the protocol specific management. Although
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OpenFlow gained its visibility as the most fundamental pillar to support SDN, it
is actually only one of many programming interfaces to the data plane. Multiple
other interfaces and protocols such as OVSDB [66], SNMP [72], and various NFV
applications also play a significant role in the evolution of the SDN management
architecture.
 Heterogeneous deployment problem: Moreover, from the practical network oper-
ation point of view, SDN deployment may take a gradual transition instead of an
all-in-one-night transition. Therefore, integrating existing services and protocols
with SDN is an essential step for the transition. Also, some of the network sys-
tems may want to employ the SDN functions only partially. For example, inter
data center networks may want to use the provisioning functionality only, but use
their existing management tools. This will result a heterogeneous management en-
vironment. A complex combination of multiple and heterogeneous management
channels introduces a significant scalability problem.
We have investigated various network service aspects including agility, accuracy,
reliability, and scalability in order to identify an effective SDN network management sys-
tem. This dissertation intensively focuses on scalability issues. We propose a filtering and
common processing module that facilitates various communication interfaces to collect
network events. It also provides common filtering and event mitigation functions to sim-
plify the event processing for the user-defined monitoring modules. In order to validate
the functionalities of our proposed schemes, we implemented the proposed schemes and
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metrics in OpenFlow with OpenWrt [54] based switches. In collaboration with Electron-
ics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), we also implemented our pro-
posed modules in an intelligent management middlebox called Software-defined Unified
Monitoring Agent (SUMA) [8] that becomes one logical point of intelligence for the inte-
grated management services. SUMA is an essential switch-side middlebox that provides
control and management abstraction and filtering layer among vNMS, SDN controllers,
legacy NMS, and OpenFlow switches. SUMA performs light weight event detection and
filtering, and the correlation will be conducted in vNMS. The two-tier framework is used
to balance the performance impact between network devices and controllers, to provide
scalability, and to ensure dynamic deployment.
1.4 Objectives of the Dissertation
The objectives of the dissertation are to suggest new ways to remove or reduce
problems of the existing solutions and the current OpenFlow specification and to develop
management frameworks that improve HA and scalability of the current Software-Defined
Networking systems.
The proposed framework handles two different issues (e.g., SDN HA and scal-
ability) and consists of two separate frameworks such as the SDN Control Path High
Availability Management Framework and the SDN Scalability Management Framework
as illustrated in Figure 5. Each framework is divided into several components that deal
with specific issues inherent in the SDN architecture and the current OpenFlow specifi-
cation. The SDN Control Path HA Management Framework includes several components
15
Figure 5: Overall system architecture
in the SDN controller and the OpenFlow switch. The HA Control Integrity Module in
the SDN controller and the Connectivity Enhancer in the OpenFlow switch will provide
enhanced HA performance. The HA Management Module in the SDN controller and the
Configuration Manager in the OpenFlow switch will communicate each other to provide
automated HA manageability. The SDN Scalability Management Framework includes
several components and is designed and implemented in two different platforms such as
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the OpenFlow switch as an embedded approach and the SUMA as an agent-based ap-
proach. The proposed components such as UM Modules, Interface Flapping Detector,
New Flow Attack Detector, and Event Storm Filter provide scalability against several
SDN scalability threats.
1.5 Scope and Contribution of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, we focus on two aspects of SDN management such as HA and
scalability. The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows.
 We analyze the current OpenFlow specification and identify critical and practical
HA issues that are newly introduced in SDN. The SDN control path HA manage-
ment framework that includes various management modules and algorithms is de-
signed and implemented to improve performance and manageability of HA. Two
Korean patents [48, 69] have been published and a conference paper has been pub-
lished in [68].
 We identify new types of scalability threats and propose distinctive approaches
compared to the existing solutions to resolve SDN scalability issues. One Korean
patent [81] has been published. This research has been published in two conference
papers [6, 8] and one journal paper [7] in collaboration with ETRI.
1.6 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review
related work dealing with the HA and scalability issues of SDN. Before we cope with
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the HA and scalability issues of SDN, we discuss the traditional network availability in
Chapter 3. In Chapters 4 and 5, we identify new problems of SDN in regards to HA and
scalability issues and propose their practical solutions. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes and
concludes this dissertation and discusses future research goals.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
As the control plane in SDN is separated from the data plane and becomes a re-
mote and centralized controller of the network, two major operational problems arise.
First of all, HA issues in the SDN controller become very critical. One centralized con-
troller for the network means a single point of failure. Since the controller is the brain
of the network, the network could be easily disrupted by a malfunction in the SDN con-
troller. In addition, since the underlying forwarding devices (e.g., OpenFlow switches)
don’t have their own decision engines, delays may be experienced while recovering from
switch failures (e.g., hardware and software) as compared to legacy networks. Therefore,
it is also critical to have a fast recovery mechanism to improve HA of the data plane.
These concerns for HA issues motivated several research projects on HA in SDN. We
will discuss them in detail in the following sections. Secondly, as the number of under-
lying network devices, protocols, and applications running on top of the SDN controller
drastically increases, the capacity of the controller may not be enough to handle all the
requests from the network, protocols, and applications. In addition, an OpenFlow switch
may experience congestion when it receives more packets than its peak capability or is
under malicious attacks. These issues motivate researchers to study scalability of the SDN
controller. Therefore, in order to provide a highly reliable and robust SDN environment,
we have to deeply consider these two major properties of the SDN controller.
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In terms of HA in SDN, two types of issues have been studied so far. One is data
plane HA and the other is control plane HA. Data plane HA of SDN can be further catego-
rized into two topics such as fast failure detection on a data plane and HA for application
servers that are running in the SDN environments. The scheme for the fast failure de-
tection on a data plane utilizes the OpenFlow switch’s link signals to check connectivity
among neighboring switches or delegates fault management to the OpenFlow switches by
extending the OpenFlow protocol to support the monitoring function. The scheme for the
server HA mainly focuses on HA between OpenFlow switches and multiple server repli-
cas [23, 47, 49, 52]. In addition to the above proposed HA strategies, it is also significant
to detect failures in the network fast and accurately so the network can recover in a timely
manner so as to maintain a highly available system [77]. There is little work done for
fast failure detection in the SDN area. The existing research has focused on a data plane
network. In comparison with existing research work, our research direction is unique, in
that it mainly focuses on the HA issue of controller networks and a network between a
controller and OpenFlow switches.
As previously mentioned, the separation of the control plane from the data plane
introduces a centralized SDN controller. Since the SDN controller administers the under-
lying network and manages all the flows over the underlying network devices, it is easy
to expect that the SDN controller may have an intrinsic scalability issue. Along with the
HA research work, there has been some research conducted on the scalability issue of the
SDN controller. That research can be divided into three types. The first type is dedicated
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Table 4: High availability mechanisms
Mechanisms Protocols
Link bundling
Link Aggregation Control Protocol (LACP) [36],
EtherChannel [33]
Multipath routing Equal-Cost Multi-Path routing (ECMP) [31]
System redundancy
Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol (VRRP) [41],
Host Standby Router Protocol (HSRP) [35], Re-
silient Packet Ring (RPR) [39]
State synchronization
Non-Stop Routing (NSR) [38], Non-Stop Forward-
ing (NSF) [37], Stateful Switch-Over (SSO) [40]
Failure detection and handling
Ethernet Automatic Protection Switching
(EAPS) [30], Ethernet Ring Protection Switch-
ing (ERPS) [32], Fast Re-Routing (FRR) [34]
to improving the capacity of the controller itself by using multi-cores with parallel pro-
cessing and multi-threads [3]. The second type is devolving some control functions to
the OpenFlow switches [22, 47, 56, 80]. These hybrid approaches allow some degree of
intelligence to the OpenFlow switches. By offloading some control functions from the
controller, they expect to reduce workloads imposed on the controller. We will see in de-
tail what functions/intelligence are left in the OpenFlow switches. Last but not least, the
third type of solution is clustering multiple controllers [1, 50, 51, 75]. These approaches
show how they can synchronize global visibility of network state changes across the mul-
tiple controllers in the cluster.
2.1 Related Work of Traditional Availability Issues
HA is a well-established research topic and many technologies have been devel-
oped to increase network availability and ensure network reliability requirements. As
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Figure 6: High availability classification in SDN
shown in Table 4, the traditional HA architecture supports link bundling, multipath rout-
ing, system redundancy mechanisms along with efficient state synchronization, and fail-
ure detection and handling protocols. These HA mechanisms are implemented in each
network device as a distributed protocol to handle network problems according to the
dedicated network topologies. Most of the implementations of these HA mechanisms
are proprietary. Therefore, they are not readily available in the SDN environment. Even
though LACP [36] and VRRP [41] can be easily adopted to the SDN system, they don’t
cover the synchronization between the SDN controllers, correlation of failures between
the control plane and the data plane, and interconnection HA. Therefore, we need sophis-
ticated HA mechanisms specifically designed for SDN.
2.2 Related Work of High Availability Issues in SDN
In Section 2.1, we have presented types of HA techniques and discussed the cur-
rent HA mechanisms in traditional networks. HA is a well-known research topic and
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F.D.=Fast detection, F.R.= Fast recovery
well-established. However, these HA features don’t fully consider the correlation be-
tween failures of the control plane network and the interconnection network that are
newly introduced in SDN. There have been a few recent studies that focus on the fail-
ures of OpenFlow switches or links connecting them to facilitate the HA feature in the
data plane of SDN and the controller cluster networks for improving both HA and scal-
ability. In this section, we categorize HA issues in SDN into two topics; data plane HA
and control plane HA and talk about the current research work. Table 5 presents a com-
prehensive view of the current network HA research in SDN. The details are explained in
the following sections.
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2.2.1 Data Plane High Availability
As we mentioned, data plane HA in SDN can be further categorized into two top-
ics application server HA and fast failure detection. First of all, we discuss the current
research work related to the application server HA. The study on application server HA in
SDN can be found in [77]. The authors proposed RuleBricks that provides HA in existing
OpenFlow policies. It primarily focuses on embedding HA policies into OpenFlow’s for-
warding rules. They implemented RuleBricks by utilizing an expressive brick-based data
structure instead of naive tree-based data structure. They show that RuleBricks maintains
linear scalability with the number of replicas (i,e,. backup rules) and offers approximately
50% reduction in the active rule set.
Now, we discuss the current research work in the area of fast failure detection
and recovery on the data plane. As we discussed in the definition of network availabil-
ity, it is very important to quickly detect failures in the network as well as to recover the
network as soon as possible after failure detection. Fast failure detection and network
recovery in a timely manner maintain a highly available system. There have been a few
studies conducted on fast failure detection and recovery in SDN and most of them have
focused on the data plane network. Desai et al. [23] proposed an algorithm that utilizes
the OpenFlow switch’s link signal to check the connectivity among neighboring switches
for fast failure detection. This scheme notifies all the neighboring switches of the link
failure in order to refrain from sending messages in the direction of the failed link so it
can minimize unnecessary traffic in the network and reduce the effects of link failures.
Their algorithm enables failure detection faster than the controller which identifies failed
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links through heartbeat messages and then sends out an update. However, their algorithm
does not contribute to the recovery of the network. Kempf et al. [47] also considers fast
failure detection and recovery by extending the OpenFlow protocol to support a moni-
toring function on OpenFlow switches. They followed the fault management operation
of MPLS-TP for the implementation and achieved fault recovery in the data plane within
50 ms. Kim et al. [49] proposed an SDN fault-tolerant system, named CORONET (con-
troller based robust network), that mainly focuses on recovering the data plane network
from multiple link failures. Their proposed modules can be implemented and integrated
into the NOX controller. They summarized challenges on building a fault-tolerant system
based on SDN but they didn’t describe the proposed modules in detail.
2.2.2 Control Plane High Availability
Along with data plane HA, control plane HA has also been studied for various
aspects. Hellen et al. [42] discussed about controller’s physical placement in the network.
They tried to optimize the number of controllers and their location in the network. By
connecting an OpenFlow switch to the closest controller in the network, it can reduce
control delay and contribute to improvement of network high availability. Tootoonchian
et al. [75], Koponen et al. [50], and Berde et al. [1] proposed HyperFlow, ONIX, and
ONOS, respectively. These proposed frameworks establish one logical controller consist-
ing of physically distributed controllers in the cluster. Since they run on multiple physical
controllers, the slave controllers can operate the network when the master controller goes
down. Even though HyperFlow, ONIX, and ONOS consider some aspects of reliability of
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Figure 7: Two major scalability issues in SDN
the controller cluster via the distributed physical controllers, their main concerns are scal-
ability and synchronization of network status among multiple physical controllers. Cai et
al. [3] proposed the Maestro controller which supports software HA. A task manager of
Maestro manages incoming computations and evenly distributes work to each SDN con-
troller instance at each core of the processor. Since it exploits a multi-core architecture, it
can re-distribute the work evenly at the time of the core crash or software crash.
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Figure 8: Scalability classification in SDN
2.3 Related Work of Scalability Issues in SDN
Along with the HA research work, there has been some research conducted on
scalability issues in SDN. Figure 7 illustrates the scalability problems that can be ad-
dressed in the current SDN architecture. The first problem can be seen in the controller.
As introduced, SDN relies on a centralized controller to operate the underlying network
and opens up control messages to communicate between the controller and the forwarding
devices. As the size of the underlying network gets bigger, relying on a single controller
for the entire network might not be feasible. The second problem can be observed in the
OpenFlow switch. Unlike a traditional network, the forwarding device in SDN has to
communicate with the SDN controller to make a decision for forwarding or routing and
to get network policies. Specially, it is a mandatory procedure for an OpenFlow switch to
send new flow packets to the SDN controller in an encrypted format such as the packet-in
message in order to cope with them. This can create additional workload and saturate the
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Figure 9: Existing solutions to the SDN scalability issues
OpenFlow switch.
Current scalability research in SDN primarily focuses on the SDN controller. As
shown in Figure 9, that research can be divided into three types such as improving the
capacity of the controller itself by using parallel processing and multi-threads, devolving
some control functions to the OpenFlow switches, and clustering multiple controllers.
Table 6 presents a comprehensive view of the current scalability research in SDN. Details
are explained in the following sections.
2.3.1 Controller Enhancement with Multi-threading
The first type of solution tries to improve the capacity of the controller itself.
Cai et al. [3] proposed the Maestro controller for scalable OpenFlow network control.
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Since the SDN controller is the only brain of the network that copes with all the requests
from the underlying network devices, it could be a performance bottleneck in the network
system. The authors exploit parallelism to improve the capacity of the controller. They
implemented Maestro in order to support multi-core processors with parallel processing
and multi-threads. Their experiments show that the throughput of Maestro can achieve
near linear scalability on a multi-core processor server.
2.3.2 Devolving Control Functions
The second type of solution is devolving some control functions to the OpenFlow
switches. There are several well-known papers DIFANE [80] and DevoFlow [22]. DI-
FANE runs a partitioning algorithm that divides the rules evenly and devolves those par-
titioned rules across authority switches. These authority switches will handle new flows
instead of the controller. DevoFlow mainly reduces the interactions between OpenFlow
switches and the SDN controller using filtering and sampling such as rule aggregation,
selective local action, and approximating techniques. Another devolving solution, called
Control-Message Quenching (CMQ), is proposed by Luo et al. [56]. The switch with
CMQ sends only one packet-in message for each source-destination pair, suppresses and
enqueues the following un-matching packets until the switch receives a packet-out or a
flow-mod message and installs the matching rule in its flow table. This reduces unnec-
essary packet-in messages from the OpenFlow switch to the controller. Lastly, the work
done by Kempf et al. [47] also can be considered as one of the devolving schemes. The
authors claimed that the centralized fault management has serious scalability limitations.
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Table 6: Scalability research: comprehensive view
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Therefore, they proposed a scheme which delegated fault management to the OpenFlow
switches by extending the OpenFlow protocol to support the monitoring function.
2.3.3 Clustering Multiple Controllers
The last type of solution is clustering physically distributed controllers into a log-
ically centralized controller in order to increase the capacity of the controller. There are
two types of clustering techniques such as horizontal clustering and hierarchical cluster-
ing. In the horizontal clustering, each controller plays a role of master or slave. They
could have the same functionalities or may have different functionalities based on the
30
configuration and implementation. In HyperFlow [75], the authors tried to provide SDN
controller’s scalability by using as many SDN controllers as necessary while keeping
global visibility of link state changes. However, this scheme has lower visibility for the
flow-level statistics. Koponen et al. [50] proposed ONIX which is also a distributed con-
trol platform for large-scale networks. And, it provides more general APIs than earlier
systems, so it is easier to distribute controllers and collect fine-grained flow statistics with
the distributed controllers. Berde et al. [1] proposed ONOS. It is an experimental open
source distributed SDN operating system which provides scalability for the SDN con-
trol plane and achieves strong consistency of global network visibility. Krishnamurthy
et al. [51] tried to improve the performance of the current distributed SDN control plat-
forms by proposing a novel approach for assigning SDN switches and partitions of SDN
application state to distributed controller instances. The authors focused on two metrics
such as minimizing flow setup latency and minimizing controller operating costs. Their
scheme shows a 44% decrease in flow setup latency and a 42% reduction in controller
operating costs.
The second clustering technique uses a hierarchical structure. Controllers in the
cluster can be classified into two types of controllers; a super controller and a regular
controller. Yeganeh et al. [79] proposed an efficient and scalable framework that offloads
the control applications by separating the controllers into two different roles such as a
root controller and a local controller. The root controller processes rare events and while
highly replicated local controllers cope with frequent events. The local controllers are not
connected each other. Therefore, they only handle the local events that require the local
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visibility. However, since the root controller maintains the network-wide global visibil-
ity, the root controller is involved in packet processing that requires the global network
state. Park et al. [70] proposed a novel solution, called RAON, that recursively abstracts
the controller’s underlying networks as OpenFlow switches to reduce the complexity. In
this architecture, the networks of the lower-level controllers are abstracted as big Open-
Flow switches. This abstraction extracts the relationship between two different networks
that are operated by physically different controllers. Therefore, all the ingress and egress
ports of the network become the ports of the logical OpenFlow switches. Lee et al. [53]
proposed a hierarchical controller structure with a super controller that collects global vis-
ibility from the lower-level controllers. Their main contribution is defining northbound
message formats to realize the hierarchical controller in the field. They defined three dif-
ferent types of messages; normal messages, bandwidth event messages, and delay event
messages. New types of messages such as bandwidth event messages and delay event
messages are added in order for a super controller to quickly respond to abnormal events
from the underlying network operated by the lower-level controllers.
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CHAPTER 3
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF AN ACCESS NETWORK’S AVAILABILITY
Before we cope with the details of the SDN high availability issues, we will dis-
cuss the network availability in a traditional network. In this chapter, we present our
work on the measurement and analysis of the access network’s health. Understanding the
health of a network via failure and outage analysis is important to assess the availability
of a network, identify problem areas for network availability improvement, and model the
exact network behavior. However, there has been little failure measurement and analysis
work devoted to access networks. We carry out an in-depth outage and failure analy-
sis of a university campus network (University of Missouri-Kansas City) using a rich set
of node outage and link failure data and topology information. We investigate network
availability, the attributes of hardware/software and misconfiguration problems of the net-
works, the relation of link failure and node outage, and correlations between layers of a
hierarchical network. For this dissertation, we mainly focus on network availability.
3.1 Campus Network Architecture and Data Sets
In this section, we describe the architecture of the campus network and the data
sets we used for the availability measurement and analysis. The campus network of our
study is designed in a hierarchical manner which is a common practice of campus or
enterprise networks [10]. It provides a modular topology of building blocks that allow
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the network to evolve easily. A hierarchical design avoids the need for a fully-meshed
network in which all network nodes are interconnected. The building block components
are the access layer, the distribution layer, and the core (backbone) layer as shown in
Figure 10. The building blocks of modular networks are easy to replicate, redesign, and
expand. There is no need to redesign the whole network each time a module is added or
removed. Distinct building blocks can be put in-service and taken out-of-service with little
impact on the rest of the network. This capability facilitates troubleshooting, problem
isolation, and network management. In a hierarchical design, the capacity, features, and
functionality of a specific device are optimized for its position in the network and the role
that it plays. The number of flows and their associated bandwidth requirements increase
as they traverse points of aggregation and move up the hierarchy from the access layer to
the distribution and core layers.
In earlier years - until 2007, the UMKC network had 2 core routers in the core
layer, 38 routers in distribution layer, and 373 nodes in the access layer. Since then, the
core layer has increased to 3 routers. The new core router was added more recently to
aggregate some part (e.g., dormitory area) of our campus wired and wireless networks.
In the distribution layer, there are currently 54 routers. The access layer has about 571
nodes and includes wireless access points, switches that connect to end-systems directly,
and switches that aggregate other switches.
We collected the node outage data as well as the link failure data from the uni-
versity campus access network. As for network topology, we had the direct and complete
network topology information available for the network operators. We used the naming
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Figure 10: Hierarchical access (university campus) network design
conventions of devices to classify and relate devices, and utilized the topology information
tool, called ‘Intermapper’. Additionally, we incorporated vendors’ documents in regards
to the causes and recommended actions, and discussed the network operators’ anecdotal
comments on special events and actions. To the best of our knowledge, those data are the
most extensive and complete data used in network failure and outage analysis.
Node outage data was gathered by SNMP polling and trap, and it is from April
7, 2005 till April 10, 2009 with 42,306 outage events. The polling time varies from 2
to 5 minutes depending on the monitored devices. The outage event time is recorded
in minutes, and the outage duration is measured in seconds. Link failure data, which is
UPDOWN messages from each device sent to a central syslog server, was collected from
the syslog. The period of data is from October 1, 2008 to October 5, 2009. Among the
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many types of syslog error messages, we only consider ‘LINK-3-UPDOWN’ messages
as pertaining to failure analysis. The 12 month data contains roughly 46 million syslog
messages, of which 3.8 million messages represent ‘LINK-3-UPDOWN’. Syslog data has
a slightly different format depending on the device vendors and router OSes. However, the
campus network consists of routers and switches from mostly Cisco, providing a similar
format of syslog messages. Note that a link failure can occur due to software/hardware
malfunction, natural or human-caused incidents, and it may not lead to service outage due
to redundancy or recovery mechanisms.
There may be some possible artifacts in the data, however, due to in-band (the
monitoring data follows the same physical path as the user data) monitoring, the SNMP
polling interval, and nature of protocol. Failure or outage reporting can be affected by the
topology of the network. Any failure that is on the path to the monitoring system would
result in an outage being reported for all devices on the path, though it is possible that the
issue only affected one host. If connectivity is lost between the sending device and the
syslog server, the syslog event would not be recorded. Additionally, as syslog uses the
UDP protocol, data can possibly be lost due to transient network congestion, CPU load,
OS patching, EIGRP reconvergence, STP (Spanning Tree Protocol) recalculation, etc.
3.2 Network Availability Measurement
In this section, we investigate the availability of network nodes over four years.
The node availability is the percentage of the uptime of a node. For each node i, let
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NodeAvail(i) represent the node availability over a month, and it is computed as below.
NodeAvail(i) =
TTBF (i)  TTTR(i)
TTBF (i)
 100 (3.1)
where TTBF (i) is the monthly Total Time Between Failure of node i, and TTTR(i) is
the monthly Total Time To Repair of node i. This formula shows that we can improve
the network availability by increasing the time between failures and reducing the time to
recover. As we will see from Chapter 4, we focus on reducing the time to recover. Then,
we compute the mean node availability (MNA) of all the nodes in the network.
MNA =
Pm
i=1NodeAvail(i)
m
(3.2)
where m is the number of nodes in the network. The data set of the TTR per device
is derived from the node outage data shown in Figure 11 and the monthly mean node
availability for the period from April 2005 to March 2009 is shown in Figure 12. We only
use the events of the unplanned outages. We exclude the planned outages from the results
to focus on the impact of the unplanned outages on the network availability. We observe
that the network maintains two or three-nine availabilities in most months. It appears
to have fairly healthy performance, even though, to the best of our knowledge, there are
no measurements available for comparison. Delving into the details, we notice one big
drop in the availability in August 2006. After consulting with the network operator, we
discovered that there was a fire near a building that took out the fiber that month. We
also observed slightly lower availabilities in several months during 2007 and 2008. To
concisely explain those occasions, we list possible reasons for the unidentified outage
events below, based on the consultations with the network operator. Then, we summarize
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Table 7: Long term outages in the access layer
Year Month Causes of Degradation
2006
Jun Reason 1&2&3
Aug Fire accident
2007
Apr Reason 2
Dec Reason 2
2008
Jun Power outages all over campus
Jul Backup link installation & OS bugs
Nov Reason 2&3
the causes that made the performance degradation for each case, in Table 7.
 Reason 1: Issues that were either out of our control to correct any more quickly
(e.g., power problems)
 Reason 2: Issues that didn’t justify an on-call response, thus were dealt with in the
morning
 Reason 3: Issues that we were working on but took a while to fix
 Reason 4: Issues that affected monitoring but not operation
3.3 Network Availability Analysis with Splunk
We also discuss network availability analysis using Splunk and tailored scripting.
Splunk is a big data analysis tool and provides easy classifications and statistics in a con-
venient format by efficiently capturing, indexing, and correlating big data. It analyzes the
similarity between each line of the given data and recognizes the format of the messages
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Figure 11: Node outages vs link failures
or anomalies. It is very useful to quickly check various statistics of big data in real-time.
Therefore, it enables us to have agile visibility of data and manage systems efficiently.
As the size of the network increases, network operators usually focus on only
important links that are uplinks from a switch to other switches in the upper layer. Con-
sidering the limited human resources, it’s impossible for them to track all the network
messages caused by the very end links due to the sheer amount of messages being gen-
erated daily. Currently, the issues with individual interfaces are not monitored well nor
fixed unless a user contacts the network operators. However, to improve the user experi-
ence, we need to harness the syslog messages by providing an automatic tool that analyzes
network log messages and detects detrimental network events based on the institutional
network policies.
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Figure 12: Node availability (SNMP)
In order to quickly identify a network anomalies, we conduct quantitative analysis
that ranks the number of node outages and link failures. We use Splunk for this analysis
so that we can identify the problematic areas in our campus network taking the spatial
and temporal aspects into consideration. For example, as shown in Figure 13, Splunk
identifies that our network has many node outages in the “D” field of our campus. This
is a soccer field, which is a wide-open area. Since no students expect Wi-Fi availability
in this area, no complaints have been filed and it was left unfixed. Splunk can also be
used to detect a problematic network component. In Figure 14, Splunk indicates that we
have many link failures in one of switches in the “m” building. The possible reasons
could be related to a bad port on the switch, a bad adapter on a client’s NIC, or very
old cables such as CAT3. In this case, old cables caused these errors. After the new
wiring installation, these problems were resolved. Since this type of error only impacts
40
Figure 13: Statistical analysis of node out-
ages using Splunk
Figure 14: Statistical analysis of link fail-
ures using Splunk
individual end devices, it does not receive urgent attention in the current configuration.
These network events captured by Splunk are hard to monitor by network operators since
these errors don’t have a significant impact on the network operation. There is no way for
them to get this information unless they carefully look through all the node outage and
link failure events. In order to improve the user experience, we need to actively detect
these detrimental network events based on the institutional network policies. Network
availability analysis with Splunk can help network operators search problematic areas
and devices quickly and easily.
3.4 Summary
We conducted analysis of node outage and link failure data on a university campus
network (UMKC) in order to understand the general characteristics of an access network
including network availability. In order to precisely analyze the characteristics of the
campus network, we incorporated vendors’ documents in regards to the causes and rec-
ommended actions, and the network operators’ input on special events and actions as well
as long periods of network data such as syslog messages and SNMP data. This study
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on the campus network provides insights on the behaviors and conditions of access net-
work availability, and potential end-to-end availability expectations. It also suggests that
Splunk can be used as an agile network analysis tool as it helps the network administrators
identify weak areas for the overall network reliability improvement.
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CHAPTER 4
SDN CONTROL PATH HIGH AVAILABILITY
In this chapter, we present our approaches to current SDN HA problems. We elab-
orate our proposed SDN control path HA management framework that includes several
algorithms and describe its implementation. As aforementioned, SDN controller needs to
be connected to its underlying network devices and communicate with them to manage
flow requests from the network and impose network administrative policies into the net-
work. This introduces new physical links between the controller and network devices. In
addition to this, the controller can be configured as a cluster having multiple controllers
for network reliability. In this case, there would be a separate network that connects the
multiple controllers in the cluster. In this work, the links that connect the controllers in
the cluster as well as between the controller and underlying network devices are called
control paths. We will show various factors that impact the overall SLA of HA for the
network services in SDN. Specifically, we will elaborate important practical SDN HA is-
sues and propose simple and effective strategies to the corresponding problems, namely,
1) coupling logical and physical control path redundancy, 2) controller cluster structure
agnostic virtualization, and 3) fast and accurate failure detection and recovery.
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Figure 15: Illustration of unintended single points of failure (see the yellow numbers):
Multiple logical connections are overlapped such as (1) the legacy switch between the
controller and the OpenFlow switch, (2) the link between the legacy switch and the Open-
Flow switch, and (3) the interface of the OpenFlow switch
4.1 Network Management Issues: Network High Availability
In this section, we describe our observations on HA problems in SDN with a focus
on the control path which has not been considered by the existing research. In order to
identify the limitation of the HA feature of the current specification and verify feasibility
of our proposed schemes, we set up an Open vSwitch (OpenFlow switch) [62] and two
Floodlight [13] controllers running as master and slave as shown in Figure 15. According
to the latest specification, the master controller handles all the messages from OpenFlow
switches and communicates with the OpenFlow switches. Meanwhile, the slave con-
troller does not receive OpenFlow switch’s asynchronous messages such as packet-in and
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flow-removed messages except for port-status messages. Thus, the slave controller only
recognizes topology changes in the network but doesn’t execute any controller-to-switch
commands that send packets or modify the state of the OpenFlow switch. The connection
between the OpenFlow switch and the two controllers are established through two legacy
switches for HA so that we can create redundant network between the controllers and
the OpenFlow switch. We use packETH [67] to generate data plane traffic which causes
control plane traffic as well. We observe these traffic flows through this work. We discuss
three HA problems in detail in this section and our solution strategies are explained in the
following section.
Our work is unique, in that we address the HA problems of 1) the interconnection
network between a controller(s) and OpenFlow switches (i.e., control and data planes)
and 2) the network that connects multiple controllers in the cluster. We identify cruciality
of control path HA and address the important and practical issues of control path HA for
SDN. We propose multiple effective strategies in order to overcome the control path HA
issues.
4.1.1 Single Point of Failure of Multiple Logical Connections
As the control plane is the so-called brain of a network, it is vital to provide HA
for the controllers in order to maintain continuous connections and fundamental network
reliability between controllers and OpenFlow switches for the deployment of an opera-
tional SDN. As the essential first step towards HA, a cluster of multiple and networked
controllers such as the master and multiple slaves would serve a network rather than a
45
single controller. As aforementioned, the paths between these controllers and underlying
OpenFlow switches are called the control path. More precisely, the control path in this
work also includes the control plane network which is the network connection among
the controllers in the cluster. Therefore, the control path consists of the control plane
network and interconnection network which represents the network domain between the
control and data planes. Therefore, a fundamental step towards control path HA is to
allow an OpenFlow switch to connect with multiple controllers in a cluster simultane-
ously. However, as shown in Figure 15, we observed that multiple logical connections
from an OpenFlow switch to controllers don’t fully utilize the physical redundancies and
go through the same physical interfaces and links. This causes a logical single point of
failure (SPOF) in the control path.
According to the latest OpenFlow specification 1.4.0 [64], OpenFlow switches use
an IP address and a transport port number to identify a controller in the network when the
OpenFlow switches establish a secure communication between them. We find that this
simple approach doesn’t fully exploit the benefits of the multiple physical paths between
controllers and an OpenFlow switch. It also doesn’t provide a flexible way to control
which control path to choose in order to reach the controller. Moreover, this may cause a
single point of failure of multiple logical connections even if there are physically multi-
ple paths between the controllers and OpenFlow switches. Figure 15 illustrates the issue
of single point of failure despite the existence of physically redundant network compo-
nents from the OpenFlow switch to the two controllers for HA of the control plane. As
seen from the figure, the current OpenFlow configuration policy makes both of the logical
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Figure 16: Traffic of one interface of an OpenFlow switch which establishes connections
to two controllers shows both logical connections traverse a single physical interface
connections go through the first interface of the OpenFlow switch. Through real experi-
mentation, we have identified and verified that this is indeed a single point of failure of
multiple logical connections and could delay the failure recovery time which can degrade
HA performance. Figure 16 shows the packets captured from one of the interfaces of
the OpenFlow switch connected to multiple controllers. When the OpenFlow switch con-
nects to two controllers, two logical connections use only one interface of the OpenFlow
switch. As we can see from the figure, the hello messages surrounded by the dotted box
indicate that the logical connections from the OpenFlow switch to two controllers through
the same interface.
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This configuration works well when we have a failure only on the master con-
troller. The second logical connection to the slave controller will immediately recover
communication. However, if we have some failures on the intermediate network compo-
nents between the OpenFlow switch and the controllers, then both of the logical connec-
tions will be lost. Since each logical connection doesn’t exploit the physical redundancy,
this makes three unintended single points of failure as described in the figure such as (1)
the legacy switch between the controller and the OpenFlow switch, (2) the link between
the legacy switch and the OpenFlow switch, and (3) the interface of the OpenFlow switch.
Since the HA mechanism of SDN is not specifically intended to provide fast switch-over
time, the network may experience long recovery time and ultimately service disruption.
For example, when one of the components that causes the logical single point of failure
fails, an OpenFlow switch needs to find the slave controller through other physical paths.
The MAC addresses mapped to the intermediate legacy switches need to be updated or
established accordingly in order to re-establish the logical connections. As we may have
multiple hops between the OpenFlow switch and the controller, it is difficult to predict the
switch-over time. This points out that we need to effectively disperse the logical connec-
tions to fully exploit the available physical redundancy, so that HA failover would take
place seamlessly without requiring a re-connection process.
Hence, we propose an HA algorithm in order to exploit the physical redundancies,
align multiple logical connections along with physically redundant network components
on the control path, and guarantee a seamless switch-over.
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4.1.2 Configuration of Explicit and Distinctive Controller Information
When there are multiple controllers in the controller cluster, it would be desirable
to have multiple logical connections from one OpenFlow switch to multiple controllers at
the same time so that we can minimize failover progress at the time of failover. However,
the current OpenFlow specification requires that when we want to connect an OpenFlow
switch to multiple controllers, each controller’s information should be explicitly and dis-
tinctively configured on the OpenFlow switch. Furthermore the current OpenFlow spec-
ification [64] requires additional operations for adding or removing a controller in the
controller cluster (e.g., edit-config) [24, 25]. To the best of our knowledge, the currently
available SDN HA features [12] do not support an automated configuration for newly
added or deleted controllers and OpenFlow switches in the network. Therefore, whenever
there are changes in the topology of a controller cluster, a network operator should manu-
ally perform the configuration of controllers and/or OpenFlow switches. It is noteworthy
that the VRRP (Virtual Router Redundancy Protocol) [41], which is one of the possible
protocols that can be used to implement control path HA, is an IP level HA solution.
Thus, it allows only one logical connection at a time even if there are multiple controllers
in the HA domain. The VRRP does’t support an OpenFlow switch’s preparation of a
backup path to slave controllers along with the working path to the master controller.
As the number of network components of SDN such as controllers and OpenFlow
switches increases, the number of connections between the controllers and OpenFlow
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Figure 17: Management cost for the given network size: The management cost increases
as the number of OpenFlow switches and the probability of the cluster configuration
change increase
switches in the network also becomes larger through either out-of-band or in-band con-
nections. Network administrators have to configure each OpenFlow switch with mul-
tiple controllers’ individual information. Furthermore, whenever there are configura-
tion changes in the cluster of controllers, they need to reconfigure all the OpenFlow
switches managed by the corresponding controller cluster. This would become more time-
consuming, tedious, and error-prone, thus increasing operating expenditure (OPEX) due
to the augmented complexity of network management.
Figure 17 shows the management cost of the SDN network with the HA feature
obtained from the results of the simulation. Let Pc denote the probability that the cluster
topology is stable over the course of its running time. Therefore, we can expect more
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reconfiguration, when the value of Pc is small. We assume that each topology change
of the cluster takes a constant time of the reconfiguration for each OpenFlow switch.
We varied the number of OpenFlow switches in the network and Pc. The management
cost for the given network increases as the number of OpenFlow switches increases and
Pc decreases. To address this problem, we propose a robust and simple management
framework that keeps the management cost constant by virtualizing the IP addresses of
the controllers. Therefore, the logically centralized controller (i.e., controller cluster) of
physically distributed controllers can be identified by OpenFlow switches with only one
virtual identity (e.g., virtual IP address). The OPEX of the proposed scheme will not
be affected by the size of the network. We will discuss the details of our solution in
Section 4.4.
4.1.3 Unrecoverable Interconnection Network Failure
As network systems become complex and convoluted, fast and accurate failure
detection becomes more difficult. Fast and accurate failure detection and recovery are in-
dispensable to maintain HA of a network. Note that availability is formally defined as the
fraction of time that a system is operational. Thus, there are two approaches in order to
increase availability, namely increasing the uptime of a system or reducing the downtime
of a system. However, little can be done to increase the uptime, since the commodity sys-
tems do fail in practical operations and failures occur often. Meanwhile, we may reduce
the downtime by detecting failure early and recovering it as soon as possible. Traditional
failure detection and mitigation mechanisms use a heartbeat based scheme. It indicates a
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failure when no heartbeat is received from a remote node for a predefined threshold dura-
tion. There are a couple of problems with such approaches. It is difficult to identify the
exact root cause of the failure since the absence of heartbeats could have originated from
possibly various scenarios of a failure(s). The detection time of any failure could be un-
necessarily long depending on the configuration of parameters of heartbeat schemes such
as a heartbeat interval and the number of heartbeats to conclude a failure. Short heartbeat
intervals and a small number of absent heartbeats increase the control signal overhead
and may cause inaccurate premature reactions, while reducing the failure detection time.
Hence, we focus on how fast and accurate we can detect and recover failures by utilizing
additional information such as network topology and link signals in order to overcome
the current limitation of the OpenFlow specification and reduce the downtime.
Even if the OpenFlow specification [64] has been evolved to provide better net-
work capability and operability, little about HA of the control plane network as well as
the interconnection network that bridges the control and data planes has been considered.
As mentioned earlier, in order to improve HA, we have to consider not only failures of
controllers themselves but also the correlation between failures of controllers and Open-
Flow switches including their interconnection network. This could be critical because in
some cases we may lose the connection between an OpenFlow switch and a controller
and may not be able to recover the failure by a controller or an OpenFlow switch alone.
In the following example, we show that an OpenFlow switch loses its master controller
and can not get connected to any other slave controllers.
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Figure 18: Scenario when an OpenFlow switch loses its master controller: The connection
between the slave controller and the OpenFlow switch transfers only port-status messages
In Figure 18, we have two controllers such as the master and slave, and the Open-
Flow switch that has established connections to both of the controllers. The controllers
are connected through a legacy switch for the purpose of the operational synchronization
among controllers in the controller cluster. According to the OpenFlow specification, the
slave controller cannot manage the OpenFlow switch. Therefore the connection between
the slave controller and the OpenFlow switch is initially inactive. In addition, another
important issue of the OpenFlow specification is that only a slave controller initiates the
role change request when the slave controller detects that its master controller is down.
The failure detection of the master controller is done by periodic heartbeat messages from
the master controller to the slave controller. Typically, if a slave controller doesn’t re-
ceive the heartbeats messages three consecutive times, then the slave controller initiates
the procedure to become the master controller.
Suppose that we have a link failure that causes complete disconnection between
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the master controller and the OpenFlow switch as depicted in Figure 18. Since the Open-
Flow switch lost its master controller, it has to find a slave controller. However, since
the master controller and the slave controller can communicates with each other without
any error, the slave controller will not change its role from the slave to the master even if
the OpenFlow switch lost its connection with the master controller. Note that the current
specification doesn’t allow an OpenFlow switch to initiate its controller’s role change.
This situation exposes the possibility that some part of the network could be non-operable
due to the disconnection between the controller and OpenFlow switches and may have a
cascade effect on the network and lead to performance degradation. This is mainly be-
cause the current HA feature doesn’t fully consider the correlation between failures of the
control plane network and interconnection network. Therefore, we design an HA algo-
rithm that exploits additional information such as network topology and link signals along
with the heartbeat messages in order to detect failures in a fast and accurate manner. Our
main contribution of this approach is to sophisticatedly integrate various failure detection
procedures through all the HA network domains including the control, data, and control
path domains.
4.2 SDN Control Path HA Management Framework: Overview
In the following three sections, we propose and discuss our strategies to improve
the overall performance and manageability of HA. We have implemented the proposed
algorithms and modified the OpenFlow reference implementation on our real network
testbed, which consists of one OpenFlow switch, two legacy switches, and two SDN
54
Figure 19: System architecture with the three HA components
controllers. Figure 19 describes our proposed system architecture with the three HA ap-
proaches. We also illustrate operational examples for each approach in the following
sections.
4.3 Coupling Logical and Physical Control Path Redundancy: Approach
In order to fully exploit the physical redundancy of the network and alleviate/remove
the single points of failure, we have improved the OpenFlow reference implementation
by enabling an interface selection feature. As described in Section 4.1.1, the logical con-
nections do not exploit physical network redundancy. This causes multiple single points
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of failure of the logical connections. This is mainly due to the current OpenFlow specifi-
cation which identifies a controller only with an IP address and a transport port number.
We have added an L2 MAC address to enable the selection of interfaces on the OpenFlow
switch along with an IP address and a transport port number. After the modification, it
becomes possible to separate the overlapped logical connections into the two separate log-
ical connections aligned through two separate physical paths. The proposed approach can
balance the number of logical connections through multiple interfaces on an OpenFlow
switch. As illustrated in Figure 20, a little bit of improvement provides better flexibility
and makes it possible to separate the overlapped logical connections into two separate
physical paths. Interface Selector in Figure 19 automatically scans available interfaces
that are connected to a controller and distributes multiple logical connections evenly. For
simplicity of the comparison, Table 8 shows the difference between the existing Open-
Flow specification and the proposed approach. Figure 21 shows two logical connections
are separately deployed through the diversity of the physical network. Different source
MAC addresses (in the black dashed boxes) for the two logical connections indicate that
they are assigned through the multiple interfaces of the OpenFlow switch. In this case, the
logical connection to the master controller is assigned to the first interface of the Open-
Flow switch and the other logical connection to the slave controller is assigned through
the second interface of the OpenFlow switch.
The proposed approach can effectively be applied to and be even more beneficial
in the case of the network configuration with an in-band controller. This is because the
degree of single points of failure increases as the hop count increases from one of the
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(a) (b)
Figure 20: Illustration of Dspof : (a) Overlapped multiple logical connections, Dspof = 7
(b) Elimination of unintended single point of failure by aligning separate logical connec-
tions via redundant physical network with our approach, Dspof = 0
OpenFlow switches to the controller. The term, Dspof , is used to represent the number
of SPOF that is possessed by a single logical connection. Dspof increases when logical
connections share (1) an intermediate switch, (2) a link between switches, and (3) an
interface of a switch. The higher Dspof is, the higher probability it takes longer time
to recover the connection to the controller. Figures 20(a) and 20(b) further explain the
benefit of the proposed approach by comparing operational scenarios when our solution
is applied or not. As we can see, Dspof of the current logical connections is 7 while
the proposed connection shows Dspof is 0. Our solution can effectively reduce Dspof by
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Table 8: Difference between the existing OpenFlow configuration and the proposed Open-
Flow configuration
Parameters used for the connection to controller
Existing IP address, transport port number
Proposed MAC address, IP address, transport port number
ensuring that logical paths align through physical redundancy. Figure 22 shows that the
availability of logical connections with/without Interface Selector. We assume that each
component that can cause a single point of failure between the OpenFlow switch and the
controller has the availability 99%. Availability 100%means no downtime or no error. As
we can see from Figure 22, availability of the logical connections with Interface Selector
keeps a constant value. On the other hand, availability of the logical connections without
Interface Selector is decreased as Dspof increases.
4.4 Controller Cluster Structure Agnostic Virtualization: Approach
In this approach, we propose a virtualization technique to make the physically dis-
tributed multiple controllers into one logically centralized controller that can be identified
by an OpenFlow switch via one virtual IP address. It also automates the configuration
process, which originally was a time-consuming and error-prone manual process, for ev-
ery change of the controller cluster. Thus, each OpenFlow switch doesn’t have to know
about the distinct IP addresses or port numbers of the controllers or dynamics of the con-
troller cluster regardless of how large the controller cluster is. By having the virtualized
information for the controller cluster, we can reduce a significant amount of time for the
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Figure 21: Logical connections deployed separately through different interfaces by ex-
ploiting the diversity of the physical network
configuration and keep a constant time consumption for OpenFlow switch configuration.
Here we explain how we keep only one virtual IP address to maintain the iden-
tification for the cluster of multiple controllers in Algorithm 1. Virtualization that uses
only ‘one’ virtual IP address to maintain the identification for the controller cluster can
be done with an approach such as the VRRP. The first step of the proposed virtualization
is similar to the VRRP. An assigned virtual IP will be associated with only one controller
in the cluster at any given time. Since the virtual IP would be associated with only one
controller in the cluster at any given time, an OpenFlow switch, which is just added in
the network, can connect to the associated controller with only one virtual IP address to
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Algorithm 1 Cluster Virtualization Algorithm – runs on each controller in the cluster
1: if this.role == NULL then
2: while this.role == NULL do
3: multicast this.priority;
4: check CIBroadcaster.priority;
5: if no CIBroadcaster jj this.priority > CIBroadcaster.priority then
6: this.role = CIBroadcaster;
7: this.IP = virtual IP;
8: else
9: this.role = backup;
10: end if
11: end while
12: else if this.role == CIBroadcaster then
13: while this.role == CIBroadcaster do
14: multicast heartbeat packets periodically;
15: listen to new.priority;
16: if received new.priority then
17: send this.priority;
18: if this.priority < new.priority then
19: this.role = backup;
20: end if
21: end if
22: end while
23: else if this.role == backup then
24: listen to heartbeat packets;
25: if no heartbeat packets then
26: this.role = NULL;
27: end if
28: end if
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Figure 22: Availability of logical connections with/without Interface Selector
get the cluster information. Therefore, we can hide the structure of the controller cluster
behind of the virtual IP address. There is a module in a controller that can collect other
controllers’ information in the cluster (‘Cluster Information Collector’ in Figure 19). An
OpenFlow switch uses the one virtual IP address and can communicate with the associ-
ated controller to obtain the rest of the cluster information. The controller associated with
the virtual IP address would be the cluster information broadcaster (CIBroadcaster).
The CIBroadcaster will send the up-to-date cluster information to the newly connected
OpenFlow switches in the network. Other controllers will remain as backup broadcasters
and listen to the heartbeat messages from the CIBroadcaster. A new CIBroadcaster
selection will occur when the current CIBroadcaster is down or a new controller added
to the cluster has the highest priority. This election process has nothing to do with the
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decision of the master or the slave controller of the cluster. This means even one of the
slave controllers can be the CIBroadcaster.
Algorithm 2 Cluster Information Consistency Algorithm – runs on each controller in the
cluster
1: if just added to the cluster and booted up then
2: repeat
3: createHelloMessage();
4: multicast hello message to the cluster;
5: wait for responses;
6: until number of responses == number of controllers in the cluster;
7: save the number of responses and current information it received;
8: else if configuration changed then
9: sendUpdateInfo();
10: == send updated cluster information to all the OpenFlow switches in the network
11: repeat
12: createUpdateMessage();
13: multicast update message to the cluster;
14: wait for responses;
15: until number of responses == number of controllers in the cluster;
16: else if received hello message then
17: this.sendIPaddress();
18: this.sendPortnum();
19: == send its IP address and port number
20: else if received update message then
21: this.updateDB();
22: == update its cluster information database
23: else if received a request for cluster information then
24: this.sendClusterInfo();
25: == send cluster information to requesting OpenFlow switch
26: end if
We have explained how an OpenFlow switch can get all the controllers’ informa-
tion in the cluster using only one virtual IP address. Now, we describe how the cluster
keeps consistency of cluster information among the controllers and with the OpenFlow
switches. Algorithm 2 illustrates how the logically centralized controller, which is the
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Figure 23: Fast and accurate failure detection and recovery using topology awareness
and link signals: (1) The master controller initiates the recovery (Algorithm 3) (2) The
OpenFlow switch initiates the recovery (Algorithm 4)
cluster of multiple controllers, keeps consistency of cluster information. There are two
types of messages to maintain consistency of cluster information. The first one is the
‘hello’ message. It is sent by the controller, which has just been added into the cluster.
And then the controller that just sent a ‘hello’ message tries to collect the current clus-
ter information from other existing controllers in the cluster. The second message is an
‘update’ message. If there is any change on the controller’s configuration, then it sends
the updated information to the OpenFlow switches and the other controllers in the cluster.
Therefore, whenever there are changes to the configuration in the cluster, the consistency
of the cluster information is automatically achieved and no human-intervention needs to
be involved.
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Table 9: Recovery time of the proposed schemes initiated by an OpenFlow switch or a
controller
Methods Recovery time (RTTs)
Existing specification 1
Approach initiated by controller 4 RTTs
Approach initiated by OpenFlow switch 1 RTT
4.5 Fast and Accurate Failure Detection and Recovery: Approach
In this section, we discuss how to promptly detect control path failures. As we
discussed in Section 4.1.3, fast and accurate failure detection is very important in order to
maintain HA especially for reliable operation of controllers. We design an algorithm that
exploits additional information such as network topology and link signals along with the
heart-beat messages to detect failures in a fast and accurate manner. Note that our main
contribution to this approach is to orchestrate the failure detection procedures of all the
HA network domains that include the controller cluster network and the network connec-
tion between the controllers and OpenFlow switches. According to the most recent SDN
protocol specifications (such as OpenFlow and OpenDaylight), there is no orchestration
for the failure detections and recoveries of all the separate HA network domains. Hence,
our proposed protocol will be the first algorithm exploiting the network topology and the
low level link signal along with the heart-beat messages. The algorithm not only detects
failures quickly, but it also proposes another potential enhancement. Ample information
from various sources may be able to overlap failure detection and recovery windows. Al-
gorithms 3 and 4 describe the simple yet effective idea to expedite failure detection and
64
Algorithm 3 Detection Algorithm – runs on the master controller in the cluster
1: downlink signal is detected by the master controller;
2: check connectivity with the OpenFlow switch;
3: if connection is okay then
4: alert an operator for a repair physical repair of the link;
5: else
6: check available slave controllers and their reachability to the OpenFlow switch;
7: inform an appropriate slave controller to become the master;
8: end if
Algorithm 4 Detection Algorithm – runs on an OpenFlow switch
1: downlink signal is detected by an OpenFlow switch;
2: if link failure to its master controller then
3: inform (a) slave controller(s) if reachable;
4: else
5: report to the master controller about the link failure for flow table update;
6: end if
recovery that runs on the controllers and switches, respectively.
Figure 23 gives a simple illustration of the logical flows of the algorithms. Note
that the slave controller keeps receiving port-status messages from the OpenFlow switches
and has up-to-date information of connectivity (i.e., topology) of the underlying Open-
Flow switches. We propose two different solutions. In the first approach, the master
controller notifies the slave controller about the disconnection to one of the OpenFlow
switches (Alg. 3). If the slave controller has a connection to the OpenFlow switch that
has lost its connection to the master controller, then it will notify the original master con-
troller to change the role from the master to the slave. And then it changes its role from the
slave to the master so that it becomes the new master controller and serves the OpenFlow
switch that previously has lost its original master controller. We assume that a master
election mechanism can be applied when there are multiple slave controllers in the cluster
65
Figure 24: Initiated by the master controller (Algorithm 3)
as proposed in [24, 25]. The second approach (Alg. 4) allows that the OpenFlow switch
notifies the slave controller about its disconnection to the original master controller. Once
the slave controllers receive this notification from the OpenFlow switch, it will change its
role to the master. If there are multiple slave controllers in the controller cluster, we need
to run the master election process. After a new master controller is decided, the original
master controller will change its role to slave according to the notification from the new
master controller. Detailed procedures of Alg. 3 and 4 that show the interactions among
the master/slave controllers and the OpenFlow switch are illustrated in Figures 24 and 25,
respectively.
Table 9 and Figure 26 show the performance of the two proposed algorithms. The
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Figure 25: Initiated by an OpenFlow switch (Algorithm 4)
one running on the OpenFlow switch has a definitely faster response time than the one
on the controller due to its simpler procedure as seen in Table 9. The modification on
the OpenFlow switch is reasonably simple and easily adapted to the current specification
(OpenFlow 1.4). Figure 26 shows that the recovery time linearly increases as the network
size increases. The network size is measured by the maximum hop counts between the
controller and the OpenFlow switch.
4.6 Experiment and Emulation Setup
Here we describe our experimental testbed and emulation setups. We then verify
the functionalities of our proposed schemes in the physical testbed. As illustrated in
Figure 30, three servers and two legacy switches are used to configure the experimental
testbed. One of the servers is running either Open vSwitch [62] or Mininet [58] so that it
can play the role of the OpenFlow switch or can emulate a large network topology along
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Figure 26: Comparison of recovery schemes initiated by an OpenFlow switch and a con-
troller
with hosts. Note that each emulated OpenFlow switch created by Mininet is directly
connected to the controllers through Server #3’s physical interfaces eth0 and eth1. The
remaining two servers are used as an SDN controller. All the servers are running Ubuntu
12.04 LTS, which is the most compatible operating system with various SDN controllers
and other software packages, and the two servers for the SDN controller specially run the
software packages such as keepalived (VRRP) [46] and bonding driver [2] for the HA
configuration.
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4.7 SDN Control Path HA Framework Implementation
Our HA framework consists of two parts: the modules in the SDN controller and
those in the OpenFlow switch. For the implementation of the SDN controller part, we
mainly use the Floodlight controller [13] which is one of the well-known SDN controllers
and written in Java. For the implementation of the OpenFlow switch part, we use REST-
ful (Representation State Transfer) API to communicate between SDN controllers and
OpenFlow switches. In addition, since we need a direct modification of the OpenFlow
switch for our first HA solution, we also use Open vSwitch [62], which is the OpenFlow
reference implementation, to implement our first HA solution that can select the multiple
interfaces for its logical connections to the multiple SDN controllers. The Open vSwitch
is an open source virtual switch licensed under the Apache 2.0 license. It supports stan-
dard management interfaces and protocols as well as the OpenFlow protocol.
Figure 28 shows the implementation details of the proposed solutions in the SDN
controller and the OpenFlow switch. We elaborate the implementations of our proposed
solutions with the first HA solution. Our objective of the first HA solution is to give
the OpenFlow switch a capability of exploiting and selecting an interface for its logi-
cal connections to the SDN controller. We extensively analyze the source codes of the
Open vSwitch and identify the important parts of the source codes to implement the in-
terface selection module. Browsing the source codes of the Open vSwitch shows many
directories for the functional and administrative implementation such as ofproto, ovsdb,
datapath, utilities, rhel, vswitchd, and lib. As shown in Figure 27, vswitchd is the main
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Figure 27: Simplified Open vSwitch architecture
module that communicates with the SDN controller for the packet processing and man-
agement and uses many library functions defined in the lib directory. The ovs-ofctl com-
mand is used for administering and monitoring OpenFlow switches. We can query the
OpenFlow switches to add, retrieve, and delete flow entries to/from the flow table of the
OpenFlow switches. The ovs-vsctl command is mainly used for administering Open-
Flow switches’ connections to the SDN controllers. It communicates with the Open
vSwitch database (ovsdb) [66] running in the OpenFlow switches. ovsdb stores Open
vSwitch configuration information and we can query the ovsdb to see the current con-
figuration and apply any configuration changes using the ovs-vsctl command. As we
mentioned earlier, each connection from the OpenFlow switch to the SDN controller is
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Figure 28: SDN control path HA framework implementation
a TCP connection. Therefore, the best place in the Open vSwitch to locate our modifi-
cation would be the part that establishes a new TCP connection. We can find the source
code from /openvswitch/lib/stream-tcp.c. The new tcp stream function is the one we
modify to add our proposed solution, interface selector. In order to control physical
network components (e.g., interfaces), we can use the ioctl function. The ioctl function
with the SIOCGIFINDEX flag returns the interface index of the interface. Currently, the
Open vSwitch uses only one interface by default to establish multiple connections to the
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Table 10: RESTful API URIs for the second HA solution
URI Method Description
/wm/cluster/configuration GET
Get the current configuration information
from the configuration information manager
(CIManager)
/wm/cluster/configuration POST
Send its configuration information to the
CIManager
/wm/cluster/configuration DELETE
Delete its configuration information from the
CIManager
/wm/cluster/clear GET
Clear all the configuration information from
the CIManager
SDN controllers. This hinders the logical connections from exploiting the physical re-
dundancies between the OpenFlow switch and the SDN controllers. In order to solve this
problem, we modify and expand the function so that the OpenFlow switch can exploit
the physical redundancies between the OpenFlow switch and the SDN controllers when
it established logical connections.
For our second solution, we mainly use a scripting language with the curl com-
mand [21] and RESTful APIs to exchange extra messages between the OpenFlow switch
and the SDN controllers as well as between the SDN controllers. We implement a Flood-
light module [27] that exchanges and stores the configuration information of the SDN con-
trollers in the cluster. This module can be accessed by the OpenFlow switches and SDN
controllers by the URIs shown in Table 10. For example, the “/wm/cluster/configure”
path can be used by the OpenFlow switches and SDN controller. A series of the script-
ing codes are implemented to trigger the execution of those RESTful APIs in order for
the SDN controller to send its configuration information to the CIManager as well as to
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Figure 29: Configuration information in the JSON format
Table 11: RESTful API URIs for the third HA solution
URI Method Description
/wm/core/switch/all/role/json GET
Retrieve the roles of all the
presently connected switches
/wm/core/switch/all/role/json POST
Set the role of all the presently
connected switches
/wm/core/switch/<switchID>/role/json GET
Retrieve the role of a particular
connected switch
/wm/core/switch/<switchID>/role/json POST
Set the role of a particular con-
nected switch
update or delete its configuration information. There is also a scripting code that can be
used by the OpenFlow switches to retrieve the up to date configuration information from
the CIManager. The up to date configuration information is delivered in the JSON for-
mat [43] as shown in Figure 29. The scripting codes use the C++ JSON parser [44] to
parse the configuration information in the JSON format.
Lastly, we also use a scripting language with the curl command [21] and RESTful
APIs to exchange extra messages between the OpenFlow switch and the SDN controllers
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Figure 30: High availability experimental testbed and emulation setups
as well as between the SDN controllers for the third HA solution. The Floodlight con-
troller already supports various URIs related to controlling the roles of the controllers
as listed in Table 11 [28]. We utilize these URIs and expand their correlated functions to
sophisticatedly handle unexpected disconnection from the SDN controllers the HA mech-
anism.
4.8 SDN Controller Software Availability Validation: New Approach
In this section, as an extension of the SDN high availability project, we approach
SDN high availability problems from a different perspective. We propose to build a new
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SDN controller software validation and optimization framework that serves as a funda-
mental approach to improve network high availability and scalability for SDN. As we
will see in the following section, each SDN controller generates various types of control
messages to administer the underlying network. Even though the implementation of each
SDN controller follows the format of each control message as defined in the OpenFlow
specification, the number of each control message used for coping with some network
events varies depending on SDN controllers. The proposed solution verifies validity of
the implementation of an SDN controller by analyzing the types and number of control
messages generated by the SDN controller. It then reduces the detrimental impact of an
overloaded system by incorporating vitality of individual control messages. We believe
that the proposed validation and optimization facility services a fundamental approach to
improve SDN high availability and scalability as the operations of the SDN controllers
can be optimized. Detailed objectives are as follows:
 The system reduces control message processing overhead for the controller by fa-
cilitating a selective message processing mechanism. It classifies the received mes-
sages to identify the essential messages to be processed.
 The system increases scalability of the controller by reducing the spatiotemporal
control message concentration towards the controller. It facilitates the registration
mechanisms by requesting the levels and schedules of the control messages.
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 The system expedites the response time against the urgent issues by delegating ac-
tions to the immediate controllers, servers, or switches. The delegated system per-
forms a resolution first and reports to the controller later according to the requested
delegation level.
 The system enhances the root cause analysis capability of the controller by provid-
ing intelligences related to the classified and prioritized control messages. It corre-
lates the control messages with incoming traffic patterns and relationships among
objects.
 The system saves network bandwidth by reducing the amount of control message
traffic. It creates fewer control messages according to the controllers registration
and delegation requests.
4.8.1 Problem Definitions and Motivation
SDN exposes control messages from an internal device to the communication net-
works between the controllers and the forwarding devices. As studied in [9,45,73], SDN
imposes excessive control traffic overhead in order for the controller to acquire global
network visibility. More significantly, the overhead will be further increased as many ex-
isting SDN controller platforms allow a variety of heterogeneous application interfaces
and protocols to the data plane. The overhead will be worsened if the control plane uses
an in-band network that shares the same physical network paths with the data plane. If the
overhead is not controlled properly in a complex combination of multiple and heteroge-
neous management channels, they cause various scalability problems for the networking
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Figure 31: Cisco’s PAK-Priority
devices, controllers, and the network itself including slow message processing, potential
message drops, delayed root cause analysis, and late responses to urgent problems. Not
only logical control centralization, but also virtualization of the underlying computing and
network resources including Layer 4 (transport)  Layer 7 (application) capabilities adds
demands for more flexible and programmable monitoring functions per virtual domain.
Moreover, in the practical network operation point of view, SDN deployment may take a
gradual or partial transition that will result in more complex heterogeneous management
environment.
In a traditional router, there is a classification facility such as Cisco’s PAK-Priority [76]
for the internally generated packets (i.e., setting a value on the ToS field). As illustrated
in Figure 31, packets punted between the control plane and the data plane within a router
are classified and handled as “Important” packets and “unimportant” packets according
to the predefined ToS values. However, the remote SDN controllers do not support any
packet prioritization and classification facility. According to the most recent OpenFlow
specification, the SDN controllers drop packets randomly regardless of the importance
and urgency of the packets. The detrimental impact of dropping vital packets can be even
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worse, if the network and the controllers are in competition with other protocol and ap-
plication traffics. SDN uses asynchronous control messages to convey data plane state to
the centralized controller. For example, in the OpenFlow protocol, switches send asyn-
chronous control messages including a packet-in, flow or port state change, and error to
the controller. An asynchronous configuration option that enables the controller to set or
unset the asynchronous control messages except error messages is also available. For ex-
ample, it can disable all the port state change messages from a switch. Although control
message overhead can be reduced by disabling some control messages, potentially impor-
tant information from the switch can be also eliminated. Since some control packets are
vital to basic functioning of SDN and should not be subject to random dropping by the
controller, a prioritization and classification facility is needed in SDN.
4.8.2 MCVO Implementation
We facilitate a comprehensive classification and prioritization system for creat-
ing, handling, and managing the network control messages in SDN. We believe that the
facility services a fundamental approach to improve SDN high availability and scalabil-
ity as the controllers and interconnection networks can drop less impactful and non-vital
packets when the resource becomes limited. The MCVO facility is designed to provide
a control message classification, verification, and optimization for SDN. As illustrated
in Figure 32, the system includes a prioritization and classification, a type, quality, and
schedule registration mechanism, and the resolution and delegation protocols. The sys-
tem also provides mechanisms to correlate the control messages with other intelligence to
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Figure 32: MCVO system architecture
expedite a decision process.
We perform an initial overhead analysis of control messages to understand the
impact of dropping packets both with and without the priority-based suppression. We
classify the control message types with various frequencies. Control messages include
(i) messages for flow entry installation; (ii) messages for flow statistics gathering; (iii)
messages for system status gathering such as CPU utilization, energy consumption, and
capacity utilization; and (iv) messages for network events such as failure. In this analysis
phase, we have found that the priority-based suppression can effectively restrain addi-
tional traffic overhead and system resources, while packet drops without priority a scheme
can abruptly peak in the traffic overhead causing significant additional data packet drops
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especially under network failure events. Instead of building a sophisticated classification
mechanism, we develop an MCVO system using 2 bits of the type of service (ToS) field
in the IPv4 header according to the importance of the classified control message. This
enables the controllers and switches to differentiate the processing sequence as well as
to selectively drop received control messages. Control messages from the highest to the
lowest priority include (11) messages for network events such as failure,(10) messages
for flow entry installation, (01) messages for system status gathering such as CPU utiliza-
tion, energy consumption, and capacity utilization, and (00) messages for flow statistics
gathering. The implementation is based upon the agent where the initial messages from
the switches can be annotated and further filtered. The agent also forwards packets to the
different controllers according to the importance of the packets. If it is implemented in a
controller, two different priority queues will be used.
The MCVO system consists of the following three facilities. The selective process
facility is a process in the SDN controller to classify the urgent or important messages to
be processed among the received packets according to the message type and priority. It
can identify the essential messages to be processed among the received packets. The
controller also can ignore certain control messages, if related decisions are already made
or similar information has been seen before. The delegation and registration facility
is a basic controller layer function that can specifically register control message types,
quality, and a schedule to receive them. It can also delegate potential action items for
other controllers, servers, or switches to expedite the response against urgent problems.
The delegation and registration facility expedites the response time against the urgent
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Figure 33: Control message validation experimental setup
issues by delegating actions to the immediate controllers, servers, or switches. The del-
egated system performs a resolution first and later reports to the controller according to
the requested delegation level. The system also saves network bandwidth by reducing
the amount of control message traffic. The correlation facility enhances the root cause
analysis capability of the controller by providing intelligence related to the classified and
prioritized control messages. It correlates the control messages with incoming traffic pat-
terns and relationships among objects. The system also provides mechanisms to correlate
control messages with other intelligences to expedite the decision process.
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4.8.3 Control Message Evaluation
We have made initial progress by capturing and analyzing control messages from
various SDN controllers using the experimental setting in Figure 33. According to Fig-
ure 34, both IRIS and Ryu have are relatively large number of control messages. Specially,
more than 50% control messages are generated during the first one minute over the course
of a five minute duration. As illustrated in Figure 35, Floodlight [13] (FL) generates more
echo reply messages as the number of switches increases due to the message retransmis-
sion. The default timeout is configured in 60 seconds. The retransmission is caused by an
internal logic of FL. This indicates the FL controller can be easily congested only with its
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Figure 35: Initial control message analysis
own control messages. This phenomenon doesn’t happen for other controllers. IRIS [14]
and ONOS [1] have relatively small number of echo messages. However, IRIS creates
abnormally high number of initial messages. As shown in Figure 36, FL generates the
smallest number of control messages. ONOS relatively has small number of control mes-
sages. The number of control messages of ONOS linearly increases as the number of
switches increases.
By analyzing the measured control messages, we can infer a few interesting SDN
controller design approaches. The results indicate that the SDN controllers interpret the
same OpenFlow specification differently. Some controllers use far more initial control
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Figure 36: On-going control message analysis
messages. Also it should be noticed that there are many redundant control messages such
as echo, LLDP, and ICMP for the same discovery purpose. By using the MCVO system,
we will be able to further find software bugs, redundancies, and misinterpretations cases.
4.9 Summary
We have addressed various issues of HA in SDN. We first verified critical prob-
lems of SDN control path HA with the current OpenFlow specification and the existing
HA solutions using a real network setup and experiments. We then proposed the HA
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management framework that incorporates practical strategies towards building SDN con-
trol path HA including ensuring logical path redundancy aligning with physical network
diversity, virtualizing a controller cluster, and exploiting topology awareness and link sig-
nals for fast and accurate failure detection and failover. We validated the efficacy of the
proposed schemes with real network experiments. For future work, we further investi-
gate a different approach to SDN high availability and scalability by validating the SDN
controller software in Section 4.8. We propose a novel control Message Classification,
Verification, and Optimization (MCVO) system that serves as a fundamental approach
to improve the scalability and then network reliability for SDN. Unlike traditional solu-
tions, the proposed solution will analyze, verify, and reduce the detrimental impact of
an overloaded system by incorporating vitality of individual control messages. By using
the MCVO algorithms and protocols in future work, we will further investigate the SDN
control messages to verify the correctness of the SDN controller.
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CHAPTER 5
SDN SCALABLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT
In this chapter, we discuss the problems of remote network management ap-
proaches that may lead to critical scalability issues in a network. Remote approaches
are common in traditional network management and current SDN architecture to cope
with the ossified network infrastructure and the underlying forwarding devices, respec-
tively. However, since abnormal network events that occur within the network should be
inferred by the remote management system on the network edge, as explained in Table 12,
problems are often accumulated and enlarged, and diagnosis is delayed, inaccurate, unre-
liable, and not scalable. This tends to extend the legacy network’s inaccurate and unreli-
able management problems into the control plane. In addition, the abstractions towards
the remote and centralized control tend to impose excessive control traffic overhead in
that a network controller needs to acquire global network visibility. All the events that
occur within a network should be inferred by a centralized remote SDN controller and
this requires that a network event monitoring and management system on the controller
should be able to acquire global visibility of the network status as well as effectively ana-
lyze the network events to make an accurate control in time. However, as the underlying
network is an inter-related complex system, it is not straightforward to identify the root
cause of a problem. For example, a single problem may issue a huge amount of related
syslog events as well as some faults may induce a failure which is seemingly not directly
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related to the original source of the problem. These insignificant event reports may result
in false negative or false positive decisions which may cause yet another network service
problem. As the network system becomes more complex, it is not sufficient to rely on a
single type of data to cope with network problems. The network health management sys-
tem should have a data fusion facility that can collect various types of data and efficiently
correlate the data in real-time. In this work, we specially focus on the SDN architecture
and investigate and verify abnormal network events that can practically threaten scalabil-
ity of SDN and elaborate our approaches to the current scalability issues. First of all, we
explain our observations on scalability issues of SDN and elaborate experimental environ-
ments from where we can observe abnormal network events that caused those scalability
issues. Then we describe our solutions for the identified scalability problems. We sug-
gest two different approaches to solving scalability issues by implementing our proposed
schemes in two different platforms; an embedded approach in the OpenFlow switch and
an agent-based approach that is located near the OpenFlow switch. For the embedded
approach, we propose a globally deployable Online Health management framework for
SDNs (OHSDN). OHSDN addresses important network management issues including
agility, accuracy, reliability, and scalability. We elaborate our implementation of OHSDN
in the OpenWrt [54] based OpenFlow switch and Mininet [58]. For the agent-based ap-
proach, we propose and elaborate several scalability schemes: Detect and Mitigate Ab-
normality (DMA), Modify and Annotate Control (MAC), and Message Prioritization and
Classification (MPC).
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Table 12: Ineffectiveness of the remote management
Reason Explanation
Agility
Since abnormal network events that occur within the network sould be
inferred by the remote management system on the network edge via
polling, notification, and logging, the diagnosis is delayed and the prob-
lems are often accumulated and enlarged.
Accuracy
Due to the system and performance limitations, the remote management
cannot detect detailed abnormal network events within the network de-
vices.
Reliability
Since the management message can be lost in the presence of link fail-
ure and router crashes, it is not reliable.
Scalability
Since the remote event polling consumes both system and network re-
sources, it is not scalable when the network size or the number of mon-
itored components increases.
5.1 Network Management Issues: Scalability
In this section, we investigate what causes the scalability issues in SDN and de-
scribe our observations. In order to identify scalability issues of SDN, we set up an
SDN network with an OpenFlow switch using OpenWrt [54], controllers such as Flood-
light [13], Baecon [11], and NOX [16], and hosts connected to this SDN network as
illustrated in Figure 37. We also used Mininet [58] to create a large network with Open-
Flow switches. We ran packETH [67] to generate data plane traffic that causes control
plane traffic as well. We kept track of these control traffic flows throughout the experi-
ments. We were able to observe that a network with even a small number of OpenFlow
switches can generate enough control traffic on the network that induces congestion on
the network, specially on an SDN controller.
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Figure 37: Overview of experimental system setting for observation of scalability issues
5.1.1 Interface Flapping
Unlike the traditional networks, a simple switch status change may cause various
cascading actions in an OpenFlow network. For example, as shown in Figure 38, when an
OpenFlow switch detects a port failure, it will send a port-status message to the SDN con-
troller. Then, the SDN controller checks its network policy, currently available network
topology, and routing information to find the flows that use the failed port. The controller
recalculates the alternative flows and sends flow modification messages to the OpenFlow
switches in order to update the flow tables. In practice, hundreds of logical interfaces can
be configured for one physical port. If a port fails, it will also cause failures to all the
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Figure 38: OpenFlow status change scenarios
logical interfaces configured on the port. The OpenFlow switch will create and send hun-
dreds of port-status messages to an SDN controller. A port connected to the failed port on
the other OpenFlow switch may also send hundreds of port-status messages. Being the
single place of holding the network meta knowledge, the SDN controller needs to handle
all the received port-status messages in a short time period. It checks its network policy,
currently available network topology, and routing information for each request as well as
updates all the information at the same time. Considering many related flows need to be
updated, it may also send out thousands of flow modification messages to the switches.
As all the exchanged messages are encrypted, the overhead on the SDN controller, switch,
and network cannot be trivial. Furthermore, if the status keeps on changing, it may cause
a significant problem on the OpenFlow network. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see that
the status of an interface object keeps changing between up and down due to certain tran-
sient problems such as misconfiguration or partial physical failures. It is also possible
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Figure 39: New flow attack
that an adversary can keep on causing up and down situations intentionally. This is called
interface flapping. This unstable condition should be detected rapidly and should get the
operator’s attention in time. Otherwise, it may cause critical network malfunction espe-
cially in an OpenFlow network due to the related significant overheads.
5.1.2 New Flow Attack
One of the greatest advantages of SDN is that the control plane of the network
is centralized and has a global view of the network. This global view enables the SDN
controller to effectively and efficiently deal with traffic in the network and manage the net-
work. However, due to this remote location apart from the data plane, an OpenFlow switch
needs more effort to handle unknown incoming packets. As illustrated in Figure 39, when
a packet arrives on an OpenFlow switch, it checks the flow table. If the packet does not
match any flow entries in the flow table, the OpenFlow switch should send a new flow
request to the SDN controller via a secure channel (SSL). The SDN controller handles the
new flow request using the network policies and routing information. It makes a decision
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and sends a flow entry to the OpenFlow switch via a secure channel (SSL). According to
the new flow decision, the OpenFlow switch adds the new flow entry into its flow table or
drops the new packet. In practice, adversaries can inject randomly generated New Flow
packets into an OpenFlow switch port to Attack the OpenFlow switch (named new flow
attack). The OpenFlow switch needs to communicate with the SDN controller for each
unknown flow packet via a secure channel. However, it may cause control and data traffic
overhead to saturate CPU usage in the OpenFlow switch instantaneously. A FlowVisor
is designed to act as a proxy between OpenFlow switches and multiple SDN controllers
and to ensure the resource isolation within each SDN controller’s domain. However, we
have identified several new flow attack scenarios that the remote FlowVisor cannot handle
properly.
92
5.1.3 Event Storm
There are hierarchical relationships among network objects. For example, as il-
lustrated in Figure 40, a router device contains many line card objects. Each line card
object also contains many physical interfaces (i.e., ports). In turn, each physical interface
contains many logical or virtual interfaces. If objects are in a hierarchical relationship,
a status change in an object causes status changes in all the objects it contains. This, in
turn, may produce intensive status change notifications to cause an event storm. For ex-
ample, a line card failure may trigger thousands of logical interface failure events as well
as multiple physical interface failure events. With thousands of event notifications, it may
cause tremendous overhead on the switch itself as well as the network and management
services. If the event storm is not handled properly, it may cause significant problems in
an OpenFlow network due to the related overhead.
5.1.4 Various Applications on the SDN Controller
SDN supports the programmable control interfaces by separating and abstracting
the control plane from the data plane. SDN enables new applications, such as traffic en-
gineering and network virtualization and further allows for rapid and simplified network
exploration that improves network reliability, manageability, and security. Despite SDN’s
promises of flexibility and simplicity, the abstractions towards the remote and central-
ized control tend to extend the legacy network management’s inaccurate and unreliable
problems into the control plane. Although SDN’s management plane is a relatively unex-
plored area, either the SDN controller agnostic application of the incumbent management
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Figure 41: Fundamental issues causing scalability of SDN
protocols or the full integration of the management plane into the controller’s protocols
such as OpenFlow cannot be a viable approach for highly dynamic SDN management.
As illustrated in Figure 41(a), many recent SDN approaches evidence that SDN facilitates
multiple management pillars such as customized interfaces and protocols so that the cus-
tomer applications can directly communicate to the data plane to measure and monitor
specific information.
SDN opens up control messages between the controllers and the forwarding de-
vices to the communication networks. As studied in [9, 45, 73], SDN imposes excessive
control traffic overheads in order for the controller to acquire global network visibility.
More significantly, as shown in Figure 41(b), the overhead will be further increased by
traditional network management events as well as application specific control traffic, as
they may use the same physical network paths, buffers, and I/O channels at the same
time. The overhead will be even worsened if the control plane uses an in-band network
sharing with the data plane. If overhead is not controlled properly, it can cause various
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scalability problems on networking devices, controllers, and the network itself including
slow message processing, potential message drops, delayed root cause analysis, and late
responses against urgent problems. Some control packets are vital to the basic function-
ing of SDN and should not be subject to random dropping by the controller. However,
the decoupled SDN controllers do not support any packet prioritization and classification
facility. According to the most recent OpenFlow [61] specification, the SDN controllers
drop packets randomly regardless of the importance and urgency of the packets. The
situation can be even worse, if the network and the controllers are in competition with
other protocol and application traffics. In this work, we intend to facilitate a comprehen-
sive prioritization and classification system for creating, handling, and managing network
control messages in SDN. Unlike the existing scalability solutions, the proposed solution
reduces the detrimental impact of an overloaded system by incorporating vitality of indi-
vidual control messages. We believe that the facility services a fundamental approach to
improve SDN scalability because the controllers and interconnection networks can drop
fewer impacting and non-vital packets when the resource becomes limited.
5.2 SDN Scalability Management Framework: Overview
From the architectural point of view, our proposed scheme is based on a two-tier
framework. As shown in Figures 42 and 43, it consists of two functional segments, the
abnormal network event detection and filtering segment and the abnormal network event
correlation and detector management segment. In the abnormal network event detection
and filtering segment, our scheme is embedded in an OpenFlow Switch as a light-weight
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Figure 42: OHSDN management framework architecture
OpenFlow firmware extension and also implemented in the SUMA middlebox [8] as a
user-defined monitoring (UM) function. Figure 44 shows the SUMA board. SUMA
is implemented in a couple of multi-core network processing cards powered by a Tile-
Gx36 [74] processor. It supports 36 cores and each core has 1.2GHz clock speed. It also
supports a 10 Gbps packet processing capacity. Each card supports four 10G ports. As
illustrated in Figure 45, the smart packet and flow filter take the fast-path to process the
incoming packets with the line-rate. Common processing, basic monitoring functions are
all processed over the slow-path. Virtual monitoring and function manager are imple-
mented in the host user space and interact with other functions via the virtual monitoring
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Figure 43: User-defined monitoring system architecture in SUMA
manager agent in the card. Our solutions for scalability issues are implemented as a User-
defined Monitoring (UM) service and are realized on a Virtual Machine (VM). We talk
about details of the abnormal network event detection and filtering segment for both of
the architectures.
In the OHSDN architecture, it consists of OHSDN Event Detectors, OHSDN Dy-
namic Event Detector Manager, OHSDN Event Publisher, and OHSDN System Event
Adaptation Layer. The OHSDN Event Detectors include basic event handlers such as
SNMP, Syslog, and Outage manager as well as application specific handlers such as
CPU Attack Detector, Event Storm Filter, and Interface Flapping Detector. The OHSDN
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Event Detectors monitor the abnormal network events according to the configured poli-
cies. Raw data are persistently maintained within the switch, and are sent to or polled by
the OHSDN Event Publisher. The OHSDN Event Publisher selects OpenFlow protocols,
SNMPMIBs, or Syslogs to communicate with the remoteOHSDNmanager. TheOHSDN
Dynamic Event Detector Manager dynamically downloads network abnormality manage-
ment policies from the OHSDN Manager in the controller and adaptively executes them
in the OpenFlow switch using the OHSDN Event Detectors. This dynamic deployment
capability reduces performance impact on the network devices and provides scalability
to the management of the OHSDN Event Detectors. The OHSDN System Event Adap-
tation Layer facilitates a vendor independent environment to simplify the event detector
deployment as well as a dynamic configuration to filter vendor critical information.
In the SUMA architecture, the abnormal network event detection and filtering
segment consists of Transformation and Adaptation Module, Basic Monitoring Func-
tions, User-defined Monitoring (UM) Functions, and Filtering and Common Processing
98
Figure 45: SUMA implementation structure
Module. The UM functions include Packet Variation Detector (i.e., MAC) and Port Status
Watcher (i.e., DMA) which are equivalent to CPU Attack Detector and Interface Flapping
Detector in the OHSDN architecture, respectively. Abnormal event notifications are sent
to the UM Manager by the Transformation and Adaptation Module. The Transformation
and Adaptation Module originally supports OpenFlow, SNMP, compression, and tunnel-
ing protocols to communicate with the remote managements and controllers. It requests
runtime management policies and downloads dynamic event monitor modules from the
SDN controllers. The Filtering and Common Processing Module is originally integrated
with the SUMA middlebox and facilitates smart packet and flow filtering, control mes-
sage/traffic aggregation, traffic classification and forwarding, and time-stamping.
Now, we go over the details of the abnormal network event correlation and de-
tector management segment. The OHSDN Manager and the UM Manager can reside in
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one or more controllers. Using the network topology, routing, and configuration infor-
mation from the controllers as well as the abnormal network event information from the
individual switches, these managers can perform network-wide abnormal network event
correlation for the applications such as verification of customer’s SLA and DoS attack de-
tection. The OHSDN/UM management framework further enables an accurate root cause
classification and a detailed event prediction that have been considered as not scalable
or impossible to conduct. For example, facilitating a CPU utilization or packet variation
measurements on each individual router can provide a potential indication of abnormal
events such as a DoS attack. Traditional approaches are mainly based upon a watchdog
to set a threshold (i.e., instantaneous CPU utilization is above 90%). However, this indi-
cation alone cannot be dependable information to predict abnormal network events such
as a DoS attack. Hence, in practice, the ability to handle abrupt events in real-time is a
very difficult issue. Instead of choosing a remote or embedded approach, our management
framework harmonizes both approaches. While a light-weight embedded extension on the
OpenFlow switch or the SUMAmiddlebox analyzes the trend of the network abnormality
and rapidly responds to the network abnormality on the source of the problem, a remote
system performs network-wide correlation.
5.3 Disaster Event Detectors in the OpenFlow Switch: Approach
In this section, we present three abnormal network event detectors in the OHSDN
management framework such as Interface Flapping Detector, CPU Attack Detector, and
Event Storm Filter. They are the primary components in the proposed framework.
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Table 13: Notations for interface flapping detection
Notation Explanation
FI Th Flapping Interval Threshold
FI Flapping Interval to check the flapping condition
FC Th
Flapping Event Count Threshold that is a minimum number
of flapping events to start a flapping condition
FC Flapping Event Count
Fl Start Flag indicating a start of a flapping condition
Fl Notified Flag indicating detection of a flapping condition
5.3.1 Proposed Solution Against Interface Flapping
To prevent the problems caused by the frequent status changes, we propose a
light-weight, switch embedded interface flapping detection function. Table 13 explains
the notations that are used for the OHSDN interface flapping detection algorithm. As
described in Algorithm 5, when a set of down and up events is detected within FI Th, the
interface flapping detector starts to count the number of flapping events FC. If the FC ex-
ceeds the configured flapping count threshold FC Th during the flapping interval FI, it is
considered as a flapping condition. The interface flapping detector sends a Flapping Start
notification to the network management. It may take a follow-up action such as marking
the flapping interface as a logically down status until the unstable condition is resolved.
Once FC becomes less than FC Th, a Flapping End notification is sent to indicate that
the flapping condition has been resolved.
5.3.2 Proposed Solution Against New Flow Attack
To ensure the CPU resource isolation against a New Flow attack, we propose a
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Algorithm 5 OHSDN Interface Flapping Detection Algorithm
1: if a set of down and up event is detected within FI Th then
2: Fl Start is Y;
3: Fl Notified is N;
4: while Fl Start is Y do
5: reset FC;
6: FC++ for each flapping event;
7: wait for FI;
8: if FC > FC Th then
9: if Fl Notified  N then
10: send a Flapping Start notification;
11: Fl Notified is Y;
12: end if
13: else
14: if Fl Notified  Y then
15: send a Flapping End notification;
16: end if
17: Fl Start is N;
18: end if
19: end while
20: end if
light-weight, switch embedded CPU usage detection function. Table 14 explains the no-
tations that are used for the OHSDN CPU isolation algorithm. As shown in Algorithm 6,
the CPU usage detector periodically (for a slot time interval (STI)) checks CPU usages
of both the OpenFlow data path module (OFdatapath) and the OpenFlow controller con-
nection module (OFprotocol). It saves the number of clock ticks Jiffy and the observed
time T for the time slot i. A sliding window WS is used for a CPU usage calculation. For
every STI, an average CPU usage is calculated using an accumulated Jiffy with a period
time WS (Average CPU Usage = (Jiffy for WS) / WS). If the CPU usage of a port is over
the threshold Thp, the port drops incoming packets for the time interval PDI.
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Table 14: Notations for new flow attack detection
Notation Explanation
STI Slot Time Interval
PDI Packet Drop Interval
Thp CPU usage threshold for port p
Jiffy
The number of clock ticks since system boot (user mode
(utime) + kernel mode (stime))
J[i] Jiffy value on index i
T[i] Time value on index i
WS Window size which is the number of STIs
cur index The end index of the sliding window (mod by WS)
first index The first index of the sliding window (mod by WS)
OFdatapath OpenFlow data path module (flow table)
OFprotocol OpenFlow controller connection module (protocols)
Table 15: Notations for event storm filtering
Notation Explanation
EDL Event drop list
ESI Event storm interval
SNL Status notification list
5.3.3 Proposed Solution Against Event Storm
To prevent the event storm, we propose a light-weight, switch embedded event
storm filtering function. Table 15 explains the notations that are used for the OHSDN
event storm filtering algorithm. As described in Algorithm 7, when a status change event
of an object is detected, the event storm filter checks the event drop list (EDL). If the object
is already marked, the event will be ignored. Otherwise, it will check the hierarchical
relationship. If the object has child objects, it will be added in EDL to ignore the same
103
Algorithm 6 OHSDN CPU Isolation Algorithm
1: for every STI for both OFdatapath and OFprotocol do
2: read current Jiffy and Time;
3: advance both cur index and first index by 1;
4: write J[cur index] and T[cur index];
5: read J[first index] and T[first index];
6: CPUusage = (J[cur index] - J[first index]) / (T[cur index] - T[first index]);
7: if CPUusage  Thp then
8: drop the incoming packet from the port p for PDI;
9: end if
10: end for
Algorithm 7 OHSDN Event Storm Filtering Algorithm
1: if a down or up event of an object X is detected then
2: check EDL and drop if marked;
3: check the hierarchical relationship of the object;
4: if X has child objects then
5: mark in EDL to ignore the same status change events from the child objects;
6: end if
7: check SNL to remove any child objects of X;
8: add X into the notification list;
9: send a notification for the objects within SNL after ESI;
10: end if
status change events from the child objects. The object will be further added into the status
notification list (SNL), after removing all the child objects within SNL. After an interval
(ESI), port-status messages for the objects within SNL will be sent to the controller. By
sending a few representative object events, we can avoid the event storm.
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Algorithm 8 Interface flapping detection and mitigation by DMA
1: initialize the value of EC to 0;
2: set Flap Start to N;
3: set Flap Notified to N;
4: if receive a port-status “down” message then
5: if Start Flag == 1 then
6: if Flap Interval is over then
7: set EC to 0;
8: set Start Flag to 0;
9: end if
10: return 2;
11: else if Start Flag == 0 then
12: == normal port-status down message
13: set EC to 0;
14: end if
15: else if receive a port-status “up” message then
16: if Start Flag == 1 then
17: if Flap Interval is over then
18: set EC to 0;
19: set Start Flag to 0;
20: else
21: increase the value of EC by 1;
22: if EC  FC then
23: notify the interface flapping has been detected;
24: return 1;
25: else
26: warning that interface flapping may occur soon;
27: return 2;
28: end if
29: end if
30: return 2;
31: else if Start Flag == 0 then
32: == new Flap Interval starts
33: set Start Flag to 1;
34: set EC to 0;
35: increase the value of EC by 1;
36: end if
37: end if
38: return 0; == Not in Flap Interval
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5.4 User-defined Monitoring Functions in the SUMAMiddlebox: Approach
In this section, we continue to talk about the abnormal network event detection and
filtering segment in a different platform. We present three UM functions in the SUMA
middlebox such as Detect and Mitigate Abnormality (DMA), Modify and Annotate Con-
trol (MAC), and Message Prioritization and Classification (MPC).
5.4.1 Detect and Mitigate Abnormality (DMA)
The DMA module mainly detects interface flapping events from the network and
notifies the SDN controller so that the controller can drop upcoming port-status mes-
sages. Figure 46 illustrates the algorithm of the DMA module. Algorithm 8 describes
how the DMA module detects interface flapping events using port-status messages from
OpenFlow switches. When a set of down and up events is detected, the interface flapping
detector starts to count the number of flapping events in the event count (EC). If the EC
exceeds the flapping count (FC) during the predefined flapping interval (FI), it is con-
sidered as a flapping condition. The interface flapping detector sends a Flapping Start
notification to the SDN controller. It may take follow up actions so as to mark the flap-
ping interface as a logically down status until the unstable condition is resolved. Once
EC becomes less than FC, a Flapping End notification is sent to indicate that the flapping
condition has been resolved. Upon receiving the Flapping End notification, the SDN con-
troller starts to handle upcoming port-status messages normally. A network administrator
can adjust the parameters such as EC, FC, and FI according to their own environment.
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Figure 46: DMA operation during interface flapping events
5.4.2 Modify and Annotate Control (MAC)
We propose a scheme that utilizes the control message arrival patterns such as
packet jitter and variation information as well as the packet count. Although the SDN
controller may not be able to detect the remote switch problem by only counting the in-
coming packets, a different decision can be made by considering the incoming packet
arrival patterns. As shown in Figure 47, the saturated switch presents very different the
incoming control message patterns (packet jitter and variation information) for the same
incoming packet count. In order to follow up data patterns from a specific port, we im-
plemented a simple MAC (Modify and Annotate Control) facility that mainly detects the
pattern variation.
In order to cope with problems such as following up the data patterns from a
specific port, MAC provides algorithms, protocols, and facilities to modify and annotate
control messages (e.g., adding sequence numbers in the control message) to assist remote
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network monitoring, control message differentiation, control message differentiation, and
resource isolation. According to the latest OpenFlow specification 1.4.0 [64], there are
three different types of messages such as asynchronous, synchronous, and controller-to-
switch messages. Especially, the synchronous messages sent by an SDN controller in-
clude a transaction identification (xID). This will be used to match the request-reply pair
during operation. An SDN controller uses the “Stats-Request” message, which is one
of the synchronous messages, to get a report of the statistics from an OpenFlow switch.
The OpenFlow switch will respond to the request using the “Stats-Reply” message. Each
request message has a unique xID. In addition, “Echo-Request” and “Echo-Reply” mes-
sages are used to check aliveness and various applications running on the SDN controller
will send various synchronous messages to get global network visibility. Therefore, we
can utilize these xIDs to track the incoming packets’ arrival pattern variation.
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5.4.3 Message Prioritization and Classification (MPC)
We perform an initial overhead analysis to understand the impact of control mes-
sage drop under the priority-based suppression and packet drop without priority. We
classify the control message types with varied frequencies. Control messages from the
highest to the lowest priority include (11) messages for network events such as failure
(10) messages for flow entry installation, (01) messages for system status gathering such
as CPU utilization and capacity utilization, and (00) messages for flow statistics gather-
ing. We found that priority-based suppression can effectively restrain additional traffic
overhead and system resource use, while packet drops without a priority scheme can
abruptly peak causing significant additional data packet drops, especially under network
failure events. Instead of building a sophisticated classification mechanism, we develop
a system to use 2 bits of the type of service (ToS) field in the IPv4 header according to
the classified control message importance. This enables the controllers and switches to
differentiate the processing sequence as well as to selectively drop received control mes-
sages. As illustrated in Figure 48, the implementation is based upon the agent where the
initial messages from the switches can be annotated and further filtered. The agent also
forwards packets to the different controllers according to the importance of the packets.
If it is implemented in a controller, two different queues will be used. We also envisions
providing the following three facilities. A selective process facility reduces control mes-
sage processing overheads on the controller by facilitating a selective message processing
mechanism. It can identify the essential messages to be processed among the received
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packets. The following control messages can be ignored, if the related decisions are al-
ready made or the similar information has been seen before. A delegation and registration
facility expedites the response time against the urgent issues by delegating actions to the
immediate controllers, servers, or switches. The delegated system performs a resolution
first and reports to the controller later according to the requested delegation level. The
system also saves network bandwidth by reducing the amount of control message traffic.
A controller can specifically register control message type, level, and schedule to receive.
A correlation facility enhances the root cause analysis capability of the controller by pro-
viding intelligence related to the classified and prioritized control messages. It correlates
the control messages with incoming traffic patterns and relationships among objects. The
system also provides mechanisms to correlate control messages with other intelligences
to expedite the decision process.
5.5 Experiment/Emulation Setup and Evaluation: OHSDN
In this section, we describe our experimental testbed and emulation setting and
evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed framework through extensive
system experiments and simulations. We used the OpenWrt-based Linksys WRT54GL
router [55] as well as used Mininet simulation for the scalable network abnormality tests.
5.5.1 The Case Against New Flow Attacks
As shown in Figure 49, three hosts and one Beacon controller are connected to the
four port OpenWrt router. Host 1 uses a packETH traffic generator [67] to inject packets
into the OpenFlow switch. Hosts 2 and 3 exchange ICMP messages. We create a new
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Figure 48: Proposed prioritization and classification architecture
flow attack by injecting garbage traffic into the OpenFlow switch port 1 from the traffic
generator in host 1. As shown in Figure 50(a), when new flow packets are inserted into
an OpenFlow switch, they cause both control and data overhead to saturate CPU usage
in the switch. The CPU utilization of the OpenFlow protocol increases proportionally to
the packet injection rate until the CPU is saturated. It is mainly due to the secure chan-
nel (i.e., encryption and decryption) overheads for sending new flow requests. However,
it should be clearly observed that the OpenFlow protocol overhead does not exist in the
traditional switches. It makes the OpenFlow switch more vulnerable to the new flow at-
tack. Since there is no CPU isolation mechanism, the new flow attack on port 1 directly
impacts the existing regular traffic between ports 2 and 3. For example, the average RTT
in Figure 50(b) clearly shows that the ICMP messages between ports 2 and 3 are greatly
111
Controllers for 
important messages 
Controllers for 
'un'important messages 
,-------, ,-------, 
I I I I I Controller I· • · l Controller l 
t__ _ __ ) t__ _ __ ) 
C I ~ C I ' 
Controller (luster 
ontro , ,- : o ntro , : 
_______ -~--=~-=:-:~:-'.·~·;:m:0":'::::::s,___ ... ~~~;;..=·:.:-·::."'~-::!7::·:_: ________________________ _ 
Agents/Switches/ 
Controll er 1/0 
Jnter<onne<tion network 
Data plane network 
Figure 49: Experimental network setup for new flow attack
impacted by the new flow attack on port 1. These results indicate that a new flow attack
is real and easy to be created. Although OpenFlow itself does not provide CPU isolation,
FlowVisor [71] remotely monitors the OpenFlow switch’s new flow packet count to en-
sure CPU isolation among the virtual slices. However, as presented in Figure 51, when
the CPU is already saturated due to the abrupt injection of new flow packets, the actual
number of new flow packets sent to the FlowVisor (i.e., 100 pps) can be far less than the
real incoming new flow packet counts (i.e., 4000 pps). Figure 50(a) also shows that the
protocol CPU utilization stays the same after the CPU saturation where the packet injec-
tion rate is over 100 pps regardless of the incoming packet rate. It indicates that only a
few packets are actually sent to the FlowVisor. In this case, the FlowVisor fails to detect
the critical CPU problem in the remote switch as shown in Figure 52(a). Figure 52(b) also
112
[ Openf low Firmware 
Tr al lie Ci1:nc•r a l r>1 
(packCTI I) 
1q? .1 fi8.11.? 
Host 1 
Flow Table 
+---------If.M P l rrun Hosl ? 
to I lostJ 
1'l?.HiR.1 ?.? 
Host 2 
1q? .1 68.B.? 
Host el 
Controller 
(Floodlight) 
----~I] 
Tt.P prn I ll: fi6~'.1 
II' address: 192. l bl:l.1.~0 
(a) CPU utilization (b) Average round-trip time
Figure 50: Observation on performance under abnormal network events
presents that the FlowVisor cannot accurately ensure CPU isolation for the remote switch.
Although an average CPU utilization may meet the CPU isolation target (i.e., 80%), it fre-
quently violates the resource limitation. It is mainly due to the delayed response. These
experimental results confirm that remote resource control has intrinsic difficulties. How-
ever, as presented in Figure 52(c), the proposed embedded CPU usage detection function
can control the CPU resource very accurately. It also shows that the average CPU usage
is better than the FlowVisor results in Figure 52(c).
5.5.2 The Case Against Interface Flapping
As illustrated in Figure 53, Mininet creates an OpenFlow network with multiple
OpenFlow switches on a single virtual machine and Beacon is used as the main controller
of the network. The Beacon controller runs on an Eclipse debug mode with applica-
tions including learning switch (self learning from the new flow messages), link topology
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Figure 51: OpenFlow switch congestion that can not be recognized by a remote controller
discovery (links to a switch aliveness check with LLDP), and routing (APSP: All Pairs
Shortest Path). We implemented up to 255 logical interfaces (configurable) for a port. We
created an interface flapping by changing a port status on an emulated OpenFlow switch
that also causes the status changes on the contained logical interfaces. First, we checked
the controller CPU utilization by varying the number of logical interfaces. We used both
NOX and Beacon controllers. As the controller needs to recalculate the existing flows
and sends flow modification messages to the switches, we also changed the number of
switches to see how the network size impacts the controller performance. As shown in
Figure 54, CPU utilization on a controller increased proportionally to the number of log-
ical interfaces. The result shows that the controller CPU utilization became around 35%
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in a small network (three switches) with 255 logical interfaces for a port. It indicates
that a simple port status change can cause great overhead in an OpenFlow network. We
tested both the CPU utilization and the number of messages on a controller with an inter-
face flapping detection algorithm by varying the number of switches. We used a Beacon
controller with 255 logical interfaces for each switch port. As the controller recalculated
the flows and sent flow modification messages, the network size impacted the controller
performance. As presented in Figures 55(a) and 55(b), without the interface flapping de-
tection algorithm, the controller CPU utilization was increased about 30% and the number
of received messages was increased around 80K messages. Considering a relatively small
network (six switches) was used in the experiment, it caused a significant performance
overhead. However, with the interface flapping detection algorithm, the controller’s CPU
utilization was kept at less than 5% and the number of messages was far less than 5K
messages. The event storm filtering algorithm was applied in this experiment along with
the interface flapping detection algorithm. It indicates that a simple embedded algorithm
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Figure 53: OpenFlow switch congestion that can not be recognized by a remote controller
can achieve significant performance improvement especially in an OpenFlow network.
5.5.3 The Case Against Event Storm
We created an event storm by changing the port status on a switch that also caused
the status changes on the contained logical interfaces. We checked the average CPU
utilization of a switch by varying the number of logical interfaces up to 200 ports. As
shown in Figure 56, the average CPU utilization becomes around 30% with 200 logical
interfaces for a port without the using event storm filtering while it is only 3% by using the
event filtering algorithm. Considering typical configurations on the switches, it indicates
that a simple port status change can cause great overhead in an OpenFlow network.
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5.6 Experiment and Evaluation: UM Functions
In this section, we describe our experimental testbed and validate the effectiveness
and efficiency of our proposed framework through extensive system experiments. We
used the ETRI’s network testbed as shown in Figure 57 in order to validate the proposed
scalability solutions implemented in the SUMA middlebox. This network testbed is also
used for the industry demonstrations at GLOBECOM 2014 [5]. As shown in Figure 58,
the proposed UM monitoring modules are integrated into the ETRI’s SUMA middlebox
that taps the control messages from the network and interprets raw network messages into
meaningful network events.
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5.6.1 Detect and Mitigate Abnormality (DMA)
We validate the DMA function running in the SUMA middlebox. As explained
in Section 5.4.1, DMA is designed to detect the interface flapping and notify the con-
troller about abnormal network events. Figure 59 shows log messages obtained from the
controller before and after loading the DMA module. As we can see, before we load the
DMA module into the SUMA middlebox, DeviceManager and LinkDiscoveryManager
modules of the controller are activated in order to respond to and cope with the interface
flapping events (Case #1). After we load and run the DMA feature with the SUMA mid-
dlebox (Case #2), we can see the controller is not responding to the interface flapping
events any more (Case #3). The controller simply ignores the interface flapping events
from the specific port and calculates the route based on the rest of available ports or other
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Figure 56: Event storm impacts CPU utilization
OpenFlow switches. Therefore, we can alleviate the detrimental effect of the interface
flapping events.
5.6.2 Modify and Annotate Control (MAC)
We also validate the MAC function running in the SUMA middlebox. Due to
the limited permission to the ETRI’s network system, we couldn’t capture the screen
shots of the MAC operation. However, as we mentioned, the DMA and MAC functions
have been demonstrated in the industry demonstrations at GLOBECOM 2014 [5] and its
effectiveness and efficiency has been shown in Section 5.5.1.
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Figure 57: ETRI’s experimental network architecture
5.7 SDN Scalability Framework Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation of OHSDN abnormal network
event detectors and UM monitoring services in the SUMA middlebox [8] that can be
easily integrated with the current SDN systems.
For the implementation of the abnormal network event detection and filtering seg-
ment, we used the C, Python, and C++ languages, which are compatible with Open-
Wrt [54], Mininet [58], and software implementation of the SUMA board, respectively.
In addition, we also used RESTful APIs to communicate between the SDN controller
and the SUMA middlebox. We have implemented the CPU resource isolation function
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Figure 58: System architecture with DMA and MAC in the SUMA middlebox
and the event storm filtering algorithm in the OpenWrt switch. The interface flapping
detection function is implemented in the Mininet simulation environment that enables the
creation of a virtual OpenFlow network on a single machine. For the implementation
of the abnormal network event correlation and detector management segment, we used
Floodlight [13] and IRIS [14] controllers which are written in Java.
For the direct communication between the UM functions and the SDN controller,
we implemented a communication extension using curl commands [21] in the Transfor-
mation and Adaptation Module (Figure 43). It structures the notification from the UM
functions in the JSON format and sends them to the UM Manager in the SDN controller.
Table 16 shows the available path to access the functions in the UM Manager. The DMA
and MAC modules in the SUMA middlebox use RESTful APIs to communicate with the
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Figure 59: Controller’s log messages before and after loading the DMA module into the
system
SDN controller when abnormal network events are detected. As listed in Table 16, the
addresses used by the DMA and MAC modules are “http://localhost:8080/wm/dmastatus/
dmaalert/json” and “http://localhost:8080/wm/mac/alert/json”, respectively. The detected
network abnormality report will be integrated with these requests and the controller will
parse the report from the request. Whenever there is a request using the above ad-
dress, the SDN controller executes the module that is correlated with the requested ad-
dress. The implementation on the IRIS and Floodlight controllers can be found in “Tor-
pedo/src/etri/sdn/controller/module/ statemanager/” and “floodlight/src/main/java/it/park/”,
respectively.
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Table 16: RESTful API URIs for the DMA and MAC modules
URI Method Description
/wm/dmastatus/dmaalert/json GET
Get all the status information of ports of
OpenFlow switches that currently experi-
ence interface flapping
/wm/dmastatus/dmaalert/json POST
Send notification of interface flapping events
on a specific port of a specific OpenFlow
switch
/wm/mac/alert/json POST
Send notification of congestion on a specific
OpenFlow switch
5.8 Summary
We’ve proposed a two-tier network management framework that includes the ab-
normal network event correlation and detector management segment and the abnormal
network event detection and filtering segment. As we discussed, in order to assess the
health of a network, maintain a reliable network, and handle abnormal network events,
traditional networks and current SDN architecture mainly take a remote approach to net-
work management where raw network events or measured data are sent to a remote moni-
tor or controller. This remote approach makes the real-time network monitoring unreliable
and difficult and may cause various scalability issues as it delays root cause analysis and
slows down response against urgent problems. We have shown that they are ineffective
and vulnerable to various abnormal network events using concrete examples including
new flow attacks, interface flapping, and event storm. We’ve implemented the two-tier
network management framework in two different platforms. The OHSDN (Online Health
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Management Framework for SDNs) is implemented in an OpenFlow switch as an embed-
ded light-weight detector/analyzer. It is a practical abnormal network event management
system. It works on SDN architecture (i.e., vendor-agnostic) and succinctly addresses the
issues of agility, accuracy, reliability, and scalability. In addition, the proposed frame-
work is implemented as an agent-based network management in the SUMA middlebox.
We have shown the effectiveness of these approaches, especially compared to the plain
OpenFlow environment.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK
As our daily life gets more dependent on essential and important services con-
nected to the Internet, network reliability has never been more important. To deal with
network reliability, we have mainly focused and studied network high availability and
scalability. This dissertation specifically focused on Software-Defined Networks (SDN),
identified new issues of network high availability and scalability of SDN, and solved the
problems using various schemes and algorithms.
First of all, we addressed the various issues of network high availability in SDN.
We verified the critical issues of control path high availability with the current OpenFlow
specification and the existing high availability solutions using a real network setup and
experiments. We then proposed the practical strategies towards building control path HA
including ensuring logical path redundancy aligning with physical network diversity, vir-
tualizing a controller cluster, and exploiting topology awareness and link signals for fast
and accurate failure detection and failover. We validated the functionalities of the pro-
posed schemes with real network experiments. Secondly, we addressed the various issues
of scalability in SDN. We proposed various schemes and algorithms using event filtering,
annotation, prioritization and classification techniques to alleviate the workloads of SDN
controllers. Our proposed schemes and algorithms improved scalability of the SDN net-
works without sacrificing global view of SDN controllers or performance of OpenFlow
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switches.
As future work, further investigation and development can be continued by ap-
plying the proposed HA scenarios and algorithms on the control path for efficient and
reliable mechanisms to achieve HA for the carrier-grade SDN networks where we con-
sider a large scale network deployment. In addition, a new approach to improve network
high availability and scalability of the SDN controller can be further investigated by vali-
dating the SDN controller software. For scalability work, by comparing the performance
of the proposed scalability solutions deployed in the embedded approach and the agent-
based approach, the best deployment location of the scalability functions can be verified
and determined in the context of SDN.
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